Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Towards a Critique of Hegel's Philosophy', 'Phil Applications of Cognitive Science' and 'Meinong on Complexes and Assumptions'

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26 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 1. History of Philosophy
19441 All philosophies presuppose their historical moment, and arise from it [Feuerbach]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
19442 I don't study Plato for his own sake; the primary aim is always understanding [Feuerbach]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
19444 Each proposition has an antithesis, and truth exists as its refutation [Feuerbach]
19445 A dialectician has to be his own opponent [Feuerbach]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
19443 Truth forges an impersonal unity between people [Feuerbach]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 6. Making Negative Truths
21544 It seems that when a proposition is false, something must fail to subsist [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
21539 Excluded middle can be stated psychologically, as denial of p implies assertion of not-p [Russell]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
4045 Children may have three innate principles which enable them to learn to count [Goldman]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
4044 Rat behaviour reveals a considerable ability to count [Goldman]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
21538 If two people perceive the same object, the object of perception can't be in the mind [Russell]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
19446 To our consciousness it is language which looks unreal [Feuerbach]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 2. Categorisation
4048 Infant brains appear to have inbuilt ontological categories [Goldman]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
21534 The only thing we can say about relations is that they relate [Russell]
21540 Relational propositions seem to be 'about' their terms, rather than about the relation [Russell]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
21536 When I perceive a melody, I do not perceive the notes as existing [Russell]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / c. Individuation by location
21535 Objects only exist if they 'occupy' space and time [Russell]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 5. Contingency
21533 Contingency arises from tensed verbs changing the propositions to which they refer [Russell]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism
21537 I assume we perceive the actual objects, and not their 'presentations' [Russell]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / d. Absolute idealism
19447 The Absolute is the 'and' which unites 'spirit and nature' [Feuerbach]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
4043 Elephants can be correctly identified from as few as three primitive shapes [Goldman]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
4049 The way in which colour experiences are evoked is physically odd and unpredictable [Goldman]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 2. Associationism
4047 Gestalt psychology proposes inbuilt proximity, similarity, smoothness and closure principles [Goldman]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
21532 Full empiricism is not tenable, but empirical investigation is always essential [Russell]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / b. Error
21542 Do incorrect judgements have non-existent, or mental, or external objects? [Russell]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
21541 The complexity of the content correlates with the complexity of the object [Russell]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
21543 If p is false, then believing not-p is knowing a truth, so negative propositions must exist [Russell]