Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Towards a Critique of Hegel's Philosophy', 'Ordinary Objects' and 'Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

40 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 1. History of Philosophy
19441 All philosophies presuppose their historical moment, and arise from it [Feuerbach]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
19442 I don't study Plato for his own sake; the primary aim is always understanding [Feuerbach]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
19444 Each proposition has an antithesis, and truth exists as its refutation [Feuerbach]
19445 A dialectician has to be his own opponent [Feuerbach]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
19443 Truth forges an impersonal unity between people [Feuerbach]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
14480 Maybe analytic truths do not require truth-makers, as they place no demands on the world [Thomasson]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 6. Entailment
14471 Analytical entailments arise from combinations of meanings and inference rules [Thomasson]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
14493 Existence might require playing a role in explanation, or in a causal story, or being composed in some way [Thomasson]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
14491 Rival ontological claims can both be true, if there are analytic relationships between them [Thomasson]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / d. Commitment of theories
14489 Theories do not avoid commitment to entities by avoiding certain terms or concepts [Thomasson]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
19446 To our consciousness it is language which looks unreal [Feuerbach]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
14487 The simple existence conditions for objects are established by our practices, and are met [Thomasson]
14485 Ordinary objects may be not indispensable, but they are nearly unavoidable [Thomasson]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
14508 A 'thisness' is a thing's property of being identical with itself (not the possession of self-identity) [Adams,RM]
14511 There are cases where mere qualities would not ensure an intrinsic identity [Adams,RM]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
21651 It is analytic that if simples are arranged chair-wise, then there is a chair [Thomasson, by Hofweber]
14486 Eliminativists haven't found existence conditions for chairs, beyond those of the word 'chair' [Thomasson]
14467 Ordinary objects are rejected, to avoid contradictions, or for greater economy in thought [Thomasson]
14479 To individuate people we need conventions, but conventions are made up by people [Thomasson]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / c. Unity as conceptual
14481 Wherever an object exists, there are intrinsic properties instantiating every modal profile [Thomasson]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
14482 If the statue and the lump are two objects, they require separate properties, so we could add their masses [Thomasson]
14483 Given the similarity of statue and lump, what could possibly ground their modal properties? [Thomasson]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
12031 Essences are taken to be qualitative properties [Adams,RM]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
14476 Identity claims between objects are only well-formed if the categories are specified [Thomasson]
14477 Identical entities must be of the same category, and meet the criteria for the category [Thomasson]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
12034 If the universe was cyclical, totally indiscernible events might occur from time to time [Adams,RM]
14510 Two events might be indiscernible yet distinct, if there was a universe cyclical in time [Adams,RM]
16455 Black's two globes might be one globe in highly curved space [Adams,RM]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 3. Necessity by Convention
14478 Modal Conventionalism says modality is analytic, not intrinsic to the world, and linguistic [Thomasson]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
14507 Are possible worlds just qualities, or do they include primitive identities as well? [Adams,RM]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / b. Worlds as fictions
11964 Possible worlds are world-stories, maximal descriptions of whole non-existent worlds [Adams,RM, by Molnar]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / d. Haecceitism
16451 Adams says anti-haecceitism reduces all thisness to suchness [Adams,RM, by Stalnaker]
11901 Haecceitism may or may not involve some logical connection to essence [Adams,RM, by Mackie,P]
14512 Moderate Haecceitism says transworld identities are primitive, but connected to qualities [Adams,RM]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / d. Absolute idealism
19447 The Absolute is the 'and' which unites 'spirit and nature' [Feuerbach]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 1. Common Sense
14466 A chief task of philosophy is making reflective sense of our common sense worldview [Thomasson]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / a. Direct reference
12032 Direct reference is by proper names, or indexicals, or referential uses of descriptions [Adams,RM]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
14475 How can causal theories of reference handle nonexistence claims? [Thomasson]
14474 Pure causal theories of reference have the 'qua problem', of what sort of things is being referred to [Thomasson]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 1. Analytic Propositions
14488 Analyticity is revealed through redundancy, as in 'He bought a house and a building' [Thomasson]