29 ideas
19441 | All philosophies presuppose their historical moment, and arise from it [Feuerbach] |
19442 | I don't study Plato for his own sake; the primary aim is always understanding [Feuerbach] |
19444 | Each proposition has an antithesis, and truth exists as its refutation [Feuerbach] |
19445 | A dialectician has to be his own opponent [Feuerbach] |
10041 | Impredicative Definitions refer to the totality to which the object itself belongs [Gödel] |
19443 | Truth forges an impersonal unity between people [Feuerbach] |
21716 | In simple type theory the axiom of Separation is better than Reducibility [Gödel, by Linsky,B] |
10035 | Mathematical Logic is a non-numerical branch of mathematics, and the supreme science [Gödel] |
10042 | Reference to a totality need not refer to a conjunction of all its elements [Gödel] |
10038 | A logical system needs a syntactical survey of all possible expressions [Gödel] |
10046 | The generalized Continuum Hypothesis asserts a discontinuity in cardinal numbers [Gödel] |
10039 | Some arithmetical problems require assumptions which transcend arithmetic [Gödel] |
10043 | Mathematical objects are as essential as physical objects are for perception [Gödel] |
10045 | Impredicative definitions are admitted into ordinary mathematics [Gödel] |
5791 | Reduction is either by elimination, or by explanation [Searle] |
5799 | Eliminative reduction needs a gap between appearance and reality, as in sunsets [Searle] |
19446 | To our consciousness it is language which looks unreal [Feuerbach] |
5790 | A property is 'emergent' if it is caused by elements of a system, when the elements lack the property [Searle] |
19447 | The Absolute is the 'and' which unites 'spirit and nature' [Feuerbach] |
5792 | Explanation of how we unify our mental stimuli into a single experience is the 'binding problem' [Searle] |
5786 | A system is either conscious or it isn't, though the intensity varies a lot [Searle] |
5794 | Consciousness has a first-person ontology, which only exists from a subjective viewpoint [Searle] |
5795 | There isn't one consciousness (information-processing) which can be investigated, and another (phenomenal) which can't [Searle] |
5788 | The use of 'qualia' seems to imply that consciousness and qualia are separate [Searle] |
5789 | I now think syntax is not in the physics, but in the eye of the beholder [Searle] |
5798 | Consciousness has a first-person ontology, so it cannot be reduced without omitting something [Searle] |
5787 | There is non-event causation between mind and brain, as between a table and its solidity [Searle] |
5797 | The pattern of molecules in the sea is much more complex than the complexity of brain neurons [Searle] |
5796 | If tree rings contain information about age, then age contains information about rings [Searle] |