Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Towards a Critique of Hegel's Philosophy', 'Classical Cosmology (frags)' and 'Subjective View: sec qualities and indexicals'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


27 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 1. History of Philosophy
All philosophies presuppose their historical moment, and arise from it [Feuerbach]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
I don't study Plato for his own sake; the primary aim is always understanding [Feuerbach]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
Each proposition has an antithesis, and truth exists as its refutation [Feuerbach]
A dialectician has to be his own opponent [Feuerbach]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
Truth forges an impersonal unity between people [Feuerbach]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
To explain object qualities, primary qualities must be more than mere sources of experience [McGinn]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
To our consciousness it is language which looks unreal [Feuerbach]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / d. Absolute idealism
The Absolute is the 'and' which unites 'spirit and nature' [Feuerbach]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / b. Primary/secondary
Being red simply consists in looking red [McGinn]
Relativity means differing secondary perceptions are not real disagreements [McGinn]
Phenomenalism is correct for secondary qualities, so scepticism is there impossible [McGinn]
Maybe all possible sense experience must involve both secondary and primary qualities [McGinn]
You understood being red if you know the experience involved; not so with thngs being square [McGinn]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / c. Primary qualities
You don't need to know how a square thing looks or feels to understand squareness [McGinn]
Touch doesn't provide direct experience of primary qualities, because touch feels temperature [McGinn]
We can perceive objectively, because primary qualities are not mind-created [McGinn]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
Lockean secondary qualities (unlike primaries) produce particular sensory experiences [McGinn]
Could there be a mind which lacked secondary quality perception? [McGinn]
Secondary qualities contain information; their variety would be superfluous otherwise [McGinn]
The utility theory says secondary qualities give information useful to human beings [McGinn]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
We see objects 'directly' by representing them [McGinn]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 9. Indexical Thought
The indexical perspective is subjective, incorrigible and constant [McGinn]
Indexical thought is in relation to my self-consciousness [McGinn]
Indexicals do not figure in theories of physics, because they are not explanatory causes [McGinn]
Indexical concepts are indispensable, as we need them for the power to act [McGinn]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 9. Indexical Semantics
I can know indexical truths a priori, unlike their non-indexical paraphrases [McGinn]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 1. Cosmology
Is the cosmos open or closed, mechanical or teleological, alive or inanimate, and created or eternal? [Robinson,TM, by PG]