40 ideas
| 19441 | All philosophies presuppose their historical moment, and arise from it [Feuerbach] |
| 19442 | I don't study Plato for his own sake; the primary aim is always understanding [Feuerbach] |
| 19444 | Each proposition has an antithesis, and truth exists as its refutation [Feuerbach] |
| 19445 | A dialectician has to be his own opponent [Feuerbach] |
| 9376 | A sentence may simultaneously define a term, and also assert a fact [Boghossian] |
| 19443 | Truth forges an impersonal unity between people [Feuerbach] |
| 18986 | Truth is just a name for verification-processes [James] |
| 18983 | In many cases there is no obvious way in which ideas can agree with their object [James] |
| 18972 | Ideas are true in so far as they co-ordinate our experiences [James] |
| 18973 | New opinions count as 'true' if they are assimilated to an individual's current beliefs [James] |
| 18984 | True ideas are those we can assimilate, validate, corroborate and verify (and false otherwise) [James] |
| 9375 | Conventionalism agrees with realists that logic has truth values, but not over the source [Boghossian] |
| 19446 | To our consciousness it is language which looks unreal [Feuerbach] |
| 18987 | A 'thing' is simply carved out of reality for human purposes [James] |
| 18981 | 'Substance' is just a word for groupings and structures in experience [James] |
| 18974 | Truth is a species of good, being whatever proves itself good in the way of belief [James] |
| 19447 | The Absolute is the 'and' which unites 'spirit and nature' [Feuerbach] |
| 9369 | 'Snow is white or it isn't' is just true, not made true by stipulation [Boghossian] |
| 9367 | The a priori is explained as analytic to avoid a dubious faculty of intuition [Boghossian] |
| 9373 | That logic is a priori because it is analytic resulted from explaining the meaning of logical constants [Boghossian] |
| 9380 | We can't hold a sentence true without evidence if we can't agree which sentence is definitive of it [Boghossian] |
| 9384 | We may have strong a priori beliefs which we pragmatically drop from our best theory [Boghossian] |
| 18989 | Pragmatism accepts any hypothesis which has useful consequences [James] |
| 9374 | If we learn geometry by intuition, how could this faculty have misled us for so long? [Boghossian] |
| 18971 | Theories are practical tools for progress, not answers to enigmas [James] |
| 18985 | True thoughts are just valuable instruments of action [James] |
| 18982 | Pragmatism says all theories are instrumental - that is, mental modes of adaptation to reality [James] |
| 18975 | We return to experience with concepts, where they show us differences [James] |
| 9378 | If meaning depends on conceptual role, what properties are needed to do the job? [Boghossian] |
| 9377 | 'Conceptual role semantics' says terms have meaning from sentences and/or inferences [Boghossian] |
| 9372 | Could expressions have meaning, without two expressions possibly meaning the same? [Boghossian] |
| 17721 | There are no truths in virtue of meaning, but there is knowability in virtue of understanding [Boghossian, by Jenkins] |
| 9368 | Epistemological analyticity: grasp of meaning is justification; metaphysical: truth depends on meaning [Boghossian] |
| 18980 | If there is a 'greatest knower', it doesn't follow that they know absolutely everything [James] |
| 18978 | It is hard to grasp a cosmic mind which produces such a mixture of goods and evils [James] |
| 18991 | If the God hypothesis works well, then it is true [James] |
| 18977 | The wonderful design of a woodpecker looks diabolical to its victims [James] |
| 18979 | Things with parts always have some structure, so they always appear to be designed [James] |
| 18976 | Private experience is the main evidence for God [James] |
| 18990 | Nirvana means safety from sense experience, and hindus and buddhists are just afraid of life [James] |