77 ideas
18730 | The history of philosophy only matters if the subject is a choice between rival theories [Wittgenstein] |
18704 | Philosophy tries to be rid of certain intellectual puzzles, irrelevant to daily life [Wittgenstein] |
18710 | Philosophers express puzzlement, but don't clearly state the puzzle [Wittgenstein] |
18732 | We don't need a theory of truth, because we use the word perfectly well [Wittgenstein] |
18714 | We already know what we want to know, and analysis gives us no new facts [Wittgenstein] |
9955 | Contextual definitions replace a complete sentence containing the expression [George/Velleman] |
10031 | Impredicative definitions quantify over the thing being defined [George/Velleman] |
18706 | Words of the same kind can be substituted in a proposition without producing nonsense [Wittgenstein] |
18735 | Talking nonsense is not following the rules [Wittgenstein] |
18719 | Grammar says that saying 'sound is red' is not false, but nonsense [Wittgenstein] |
18731 | There is no theory of truth, because it isn't a concept [Wittgenstein] |
18707 | All thought has the logical form of reality [Wittgenstein] |
10098 | The 'power set' of A is all the subsets of A [George/Velleman] |
10099 | The 'ordered pair' <a, b>, for two sets a and b, is the set {{a, b},{a}} [George/Velleman] |
10101 | Cartesian Product A x B: the set of all ordered pairs in which a∈A and b∈B [George/Velleman] |
10103 | Grouping by property is common in mathematics, usually using equivalence [George/Velleman] |
10104 | 'Equivalence' is a reflexive, symmetric and transitive relation; 'same first letter' partitions English words [George/Velleman] |
10096 | Even the elements of sets in ZFC are sets, resting on the pure empty set [George/Velleman] |
10097 | Axiom of Extensionality: for all sets x and y, if x and y have the same elements then x = y [George/Velleman] |
10100 | Axiom of Pairing: for all sets x and y, there is a set z containing just x and y [George/Velleman] |
17900 | The Axiom of Reducibility made impredicative definitions possible [George/Velleman] |
10109 | ZFC can prove that there is no set corresponding to the concept 'set' [George/Velleman] |
10108 | As a reduction of arithmetic, set theory is not fully general, and so not logical [George/Velleman] |
18724 | In logic nothing is hidden [Wittgenstein] |
18709 | Laws of logic are like laws of chess - if you change them, it's just a different game [Wittgenstein] |
10111 | Asserting Excluded Middle is a hallmark of realism about the natural world [George/Velleman] |
18736 | Contradiction is between two rules, not between rule and reality [Wittgenstein] |
18723 | We may correctly use 'not' without making the rule explicit [Wittgenstein] |
18718 | Saying 'and' has meaning is just saying it works in a sentence [Wittgenstein] |
18727 | A person's name doesn't mean their body; bodies don't sit down, and their existence can be denied [Wittgenstein] |
10129 | A 'model' is a meaning-assignment which makes all the axioms true [George/Velleman] |
10105 | Differences between isomorphic structures seem unimportant [George/Velleman] |
10119 | Consistency is a purely syntactic property, unlike the semantic property of soundness [George/Velleman] |
10126 | A 'consistent' theory cannot contain both a sentence and its negation [George/Velleman] |
10120 | Soundness is a semantic property, unlike the purely syntactic property of consistency [George/Velleman] |
10127 | A 'complete' theory contains either any sentence or its negation [George/Velleman] |
10106 | Rational numbers give answers to division problems with integers [George/Velleman] |
10102 | The integers are answers to subtraction problems involving natural numbers [George/Velleman] |
18738 | We don't get 'nearer' to something by adding decimals to 1.1412... (root-2) [Wittgenstein] |
10107 | Real numbers provide answers to square root problems [George/Velleman] |
9946 | Logicists say mathematics is applicable because it is totally general [George/Velleman] |
18708 | Infinity is not a number, so doesn't say how many; it is the property of a law [Wittgenstein] |
10125 | The classical mathematician believes the real numbers form an actual set [George/Velleman] |
17899 | Second-order induction is stronger as it covers all concepts, not just first-order definable ones [George/Velleman] |
10128 | The Incompleteness proofs use arithmetic to talk about formal arithmetic [George/Velleman] |
17902 | A successor is the union of a set with its singleton [George/Velleman] |
10133 | Frege's Theorem shows the Peano Postulates can be derived from Hume's Principle [George/Velleman] |
10130 | Set theory can prove the Peano Postulates [George/Velleman] |
10089 | Talk of 'abstract entities' is more a label for the problem than a solution to it [George/Velleman] |
10131 | If mathematics is not about particulars, observing particulars must be irrelevant [George/Velleman] |
10092 | In the unramified theory of types, the types are objects, then sets of objects, sets of sets etc. [George/Velleman] |
10094 | The theory of types seems to rule out harmless sets as well as paradoxical ones. [George/Velleman] |
10095 | Type theory has only finitely many items at each level, which is a problem for mathematics [George/Velleman] |
17901 | Type theory prohibits (oddly) a set containing an individual and a set of individuals [George/Velleman] |
10114 | Bounded quantification is originally finitary, as conjunctions and disjunctions [George/Velleman] |
10134 | Much infinite mathematics can still be justified finitely [George/Velleman] |
10123 | The intuitionists are the idealists of mathematics [George/Velleman] |
10124 | Gödel's First Theorem suggests there are truths which are independent of proof [George/Velleman] |
18737 | There are no positive or negative facts; these are just the forms of propositions [Wittgenstein] |
18715 | Using 'green' is a commitment to future usage of 'green' [Wittgenstein] |
19347 | Substance needs independence, unity, and stability (for individuation); also it is a subject, for predicates [Perkins] |
18726 | For each necessity in the world there is an arbitrary rule of language [Wittgenstein] |
18712 | Understanding is translation, into action or into other symbols [Wittgenstein] |
18280 | We live in sense-data, but talk about physical objects [Wittgenstein] |
18729 | Part of what we mean by stating the facts is the way we tend to experience them [Wittgenstein] |
18734 | If you remember wrongly, then there must be some other criterion than your remembering [Wittgenstein] |
18721 | Explanation and understanding are the same [Wittgenstein] |
18720 | Explanation gives understanding by revealing the full multiplicity of the thing [Wittgenstein] |
18716 | A machine strikes us as being a rule of movement [Wittgenstein] |
18713 | If an explanation is good, the symbol is used properly in the future [Wittgenstein] |
18717 | Thought is an activity which we perform by the expression of it [Wittgenstein] |
10110 | Corresponding to every concept there is a class (some of them sets) [George/Velleman] |
18725 | A proposition draws a line around the facts which agree with it [Wittgenstein] |
18728 | The meaning of a proposition is the mode of its verification [Wittgenstein] |
18705 | Words function only in propositions, like levers in a machine [Wittgenstein] |
18711 | A proposition is any expression which can be significantly negated [Wittgenstein] |
18733 | Laws of nature are an aspect of the phenomena, and are just our mode of description [Wittgenstein] |