Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Letter to Russell', 'De Re and De Dicto' and 'Knowledge by Acquaintance and Description-1'

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13 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
The main problem of philosophy is what can and cannot be thought and expressed [Wittgenstein, by Grayling]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
Maybe proper names involve essentialism [Plantinga]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
Could I name all of the real numbers in one fell swoop? Call them all 'Charley'? [Plantinga]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / d. Logical atoms
Atomic facts correspond to true elementary propositions [Wittgenstein]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
We know a universal in 'yellow differs from blue' or 'yellow resembles blue less than green does' [Russell]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
Surely self-identity is essential to Socrates? [Plantinga]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
An object has a property essentially if it couldn't conceivably have lacked it [Plantinga]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
Can we find an appropriate 'de dicto' paraphrase for any 'de re' proposition? [Plantinga]
Expressing modality about a statement is 'de dicto'; expressing it of property-possession is 'de re' [Plantinga]
'De dicto' true and 'de re' false is possible, and so is 'de dicto' false and 'de re' true [Plantinga]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
What Socrates could have been, and could have become, are different? [Plantinga]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems
My 'acquaintance' with sense-data is nothing like my knowing New York [Williams,M on Russell]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
A thought is mental constituents that relate to reality as words do [Wittgenstein]