15 ideas
7085 | The main problem of philosophy is what can and cannot be thought and expressed [Wittgenstein, by Grayling] |
14650 | Maybe proper names involve essentialism [Plantinga] |
14648 | Could I name all of the real numbers in one fell swoop? Call them all 'Charley'? [Plantinga] |
23463 | Atomic facts correspond to true elementary propositions [Wittgenstein] |
14647 | Surely self-identity is essential to Socrates? [Plantinga] |
14646 | An object has a property essentially if it couldn't conceivably have lacked it [Plantinga] |
14649 | Can we find an appropriate 'de dicto' paraphrase for any 'de re' proposition? [Plantinga] |
14642 | Expressing modality about a statement is 'de dicto'; expressing it of property-possession is 'de re' [Plantinga] |
14643 | 'De dicto' true and 'de re' false is possible, and so is 'de dicto' false and 'de re' true [Plantinga] |
14651 | What Socrates could have been, and could have become, are different? [Plantinga] |
23490 | A thought is mental constituents that relate to reality as words do [Wittgenstein] |
20033 | Intentions are normative, requiring commitment and further plans [Bratman, by Wilson/Schpall] |
20034 | Intentions must be mutually consistent, affirm appropriate means, and fit the agent's beliefs [Bratman, by Wilson/Schpall] |
20026 | Intention is either the aim of an action, or a long-term constraint on what we can do [Bratman, by Wilson/Schpall] |
20032 | Bratman rejected reducing intentions to belief-desire, because they motivate, and have their own standards [Bratman, by Wilson/Schpall] |