170 ideas
| 18730 | The history of philosophy only matters if the subject is a choice between rival theories [Wittgenstein] |
| 4171 | Philosophy considers only the universal, in nature as everywhere else [Schopenhauer] |
| 4186 | Everyone is conscious of all philosophical truths, but philosophers bring them to conceptual awareness [Schopenhauer] |
| 18704 | Philosophy tries to be rid of certain intellectual puzzles, irrelevant to daily life [Wittgenstein] |
| 18710 | Philosophers express puzzlement, but don't clearly state the puzzle [Wittgenstein] |
| 12171 | Absurdity is incongruity between correct and false points of view [Schopenhauer] |
| 21366 | Metaphysics must understand the world thoroughly, as a principal source of knowledge [Schopenhauer] |
| 14122 | Analysis gives us nothing but the truth - but never the whole truth [Russell] |
| 18732 | We don't need a theory of truth, because we use the word perfectly well [Wittgenstein] |
| 14109 | The study of grammar is underestimated in philosophy [Russell] |
| 18714 | We already know what we want to know, and analysis gives us no new facts [Wittgenstein] |
| 14165 | Analysis falsifies, if when the parts are broken down they are not equivalent to their sum [Russell] |
| 14115 | Definition by analysis into constituents is useless, because it neglects the whole [Russell] |
| 14159 | In mathematics definitions are superfluous, as they name classes, and it all reduces to primitives [Russell] |
| 14148 | Infinite regresses have propositions made of propositions etc, with the key term reappearing [Russell] |
| 18002 | As well as a truth value, propositions have a range of significance for their variables [Russell] |
| 18706 | Words of the same kind can be substituted in a proposition without producing nonsense [Wittgenstein] |
| 18735 | Talking nonsense is not following the rules [Wittgenstein] |
| 18719 | Grammar says that saying 'sound is red' is not false, but nonsense [Wittgenstein] |
| 18731 | There is no theory of truth, because it isn't a concept [Wittgenstein] |
| 14102 | What is true or false is not mental, and is best called 'propositions' [Russell] |
| 18707 | All thought has the logical form of reality [Wittgenstein] |
| 14176 | "The death of Caesar is true" is not the same proposition as "Caesar died" [Russell] |
| 14113 | The null class is a fiction [Russell] |
| 15894 | Russell invented the naïve set theory usually attributed to Cantor [Russell, by Lavine] |
| 14126 | Order rests on 'between' and 'separation' [Russell] |
| 14127 | Order depends on transitive asymmetrical relations [Russell] |
| 14121 | The part-whole relation is ultimate and indefinable [Russell] |
| 18724 | In logic nothing is hidden [Wittgenstein] |
| 14106 | Implication cannot be defined [Russell] |
| 14108 | It would be circular to use 'if' and 'then' to define material implication [Russell] |
| 14167 | The only classes are things, predicates and relations [Russell] |
| 18709 | Laws of logic are like laws of chess - if you change them, it's just a different game [Wittgenstein] |
| 18736 | Contradiction is between two rules, not between rule and reality [Wittgenstein] |
| 14105 | There seem to be eight or nine logical constants [Russell] |
| 18722 | Negations are not just reversals of truth-value, since that can happen without negation [Wittgenstein on Russell] |
| 18723 | We may correctly use 'not' without making the rule explicit [Wittgenstein] |
| 18718 | Saying 'and' has meaning is just saying it works in a sentence [Wittgenstein] |
| 14104 | Constants are absolutely definite and unambiguous [Russell] |
| 14114 | Variables don't stand alone, but exist as parts of propositional functions [Russell] |
| 18727 | A person's name doesn't mean their body; bodies don't sit down, and their existence can be denied [Wittgenstein] |
| 14137 | 'Any' is better than 'all' where infinite classes are concerned [Russell] |
| 14149 | The Achilles Paradox concerns the one-one correlation of infinite classes [Russell] |
| 15895 | Russell discovered the paradox suggested by Burali-Forti's work [Russell, by Lavine] |
| 14152 | In geometry, Kant and idealists aimed at the certainty of the premisses [Russell] |
| 14154 | Geometry throws no light on the nature of actual space [Russell] |
| 14151 | Pure geometry is deductive, and neutral over what exists [Russell] |
| 14153 | In geometry, empiricists aimed at premisses consistent with experience [Russell] |
| 14155 | Two points have a line joining them (descriptive), a distance (metrical), and a whole line (projective) [Russell, by PG] |
| 18254 | Russell's approach had to treat real 5/8 as different from rational 5/8 [Russell, by Dummett] |
| 14144 | Ordinals result from likeness among relations, as cardinals from similarity among classes [Russell] |
| 14128 | Some claim priority for the ordinals over cardinals, but there is no logical priority between them [Russell] |
| 14129 | Ordinals presuppose two relations, where cardinals only presuppose one [Russell] |
| 14132 | Properties of numbers don't rely on progressions, so cardinals may be more basic [Russell] |
| 14141 | Ordinals are defined through mathematical induction [Russell] |
| 14142 | Ordinals are types of series of terms in a row, rather than the 'nth' instance [Russell] |
| 14139 | Transfinite ordinals don't obey commutativity, so their arithmetic is quite different from basic arithmetic [Russell] |
| 14145 | For Cantor ordinals are types of order, not numbers [Russell] |
| 14146 | We aren't sure if one cardinal number is always bigger than another [Russell] |
| 14135 | Real numbers are a class of rational numbers (and so not really numbers at all) [Russell] |
| 18738 | We don't get 'nearer' to something by adding decimals to 1.1412... (root-2) [Wittgenstein] |
| 14123 | Some quantities can't be measured, and some non-quantities are measurable [Russell] |
| 14158 | Quantity is not part of mathematics, where it is replaced by order [Russell] |
| 14120 | Counting explains none of the real problems about the foundations of arithmetic [Russell] |
| 14118 | We can define one-to-one without mentioning unity [Russell] |
| 14119 | We do not currently know whether, of two infinite numbers, one must be greater than the other [Russell] |
| 14133 | There are cardinal and ordinal theories of infinity (while continuity is entirely ordinal) [Russell] |
| 18708 | Infinity is not a number, so doesn't say how many; it is the property of a law [Wittgenstein] |
| 14134 | Infinite numbers are distinguished by disobeying induction, and the part equalling the whole [Russell] |
| 14143 | ω names the whole series, or the generating relation of the series of ordinal numbers [Russell] |
| 14138 | You can't get a new transfinite cardinal from an old one just by adding finite numbers to it [Russell] |
| 14140 | For every transfinite cardinal there is an infinite collection of transfinite ordinals [Russell] |
| 14124 | Axiom of Archimedes: a finite multiple of a lesser magnitude can always exceed a greater [Russell] |
| 7530 | Russell tried to replace Peano's Postulates with the simple idea of 'class' [Russell, by Monk] |
| 18246 | Dedekind failed to distinguish the numbers from other progressions [Shapiro on Russell] |
| 14147 | Denying mathematical induction gave us the transfinite [Russell] |
| 14125 | Finite numbers, unlike infinite numbers, obey mathematical induction [Russell] |
| 14116 | Numbers were once defined on the basis of 1, but neglected infinities and + [Russell] |
| 14117 | Numbers are properties of classes [Russell] |
| 9977 | Ordinals can't be defined just by progression; they have intrinsic qualities [Russell] |
| 14162 | Mathematics doesn't care whether its entities exist [Russell] |
| 14103 | Pure mathematics is the class of propositions of the form 'p implies q' [Russell] |
| 21555 | For 'x is a u' to be meaningful, u must be one range of individuals (or 'type') higher than x [Russell] |
| 18003 | In 'x is a u', x and u must be of different types, so 'x is an x' is generally meaningless [Russell, by Magidor] |
| 4168 | Matter and intellect are inseparable correlatives which only exist relatively, and for each other [Schopenhauer] |
| 11010 | Being is what belongs to every possible object of thought [Russell] |
| 14161 | Many things have being (as topics of propositions), but may not have actual existence [Russell] |
| 14173 | What exists has causal relations, but non-existent things may also have them [Russell] |
| 21926 | Schopenhauer, unlike other idealists, says reality is irrational [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB] |
| 4167 | The knowing subject and the crude matter of the world are both in themselves unknowable [Schopenhauer] |
| 18737 | There are no positive or negative facts; these are just the forms of propositions [Wittgenstein] |
| 14163 | Four classes of terms: instants, points, terms at instants only, and terms at instants and points [Russell] |
| 21341 | Philosophers of logic and maths insisted that a vocabulary of relations was essential [Russell, by Heil] |
| 10586 | 'Reflexiveness' holds between a term and itself, and cannot be inferred from symmetry and transitiveness [Russell] |
| 10585 | Symmetrical and transitive relations are formally like equality [Russell] |
| 18715 | Using 'green' is a commitment to future usage of 'green' [Wittgenstein] |
| 7781 | I call an object of thought a 'term'. This is a wide concept implying unity and existence. [Russell] |
| 14166 | Unities are only in propositions or concepts, and nothing that exists has unity [Russell] |
| 14164 | The only unities are simples, or wholes composed of parts [Russell] |
| 14112 | A set has some sort of unity, but not enough to be a 'whole' [Russell] |
| 14170 | Change is obscured by substance, a thing's nature, subject-predicate form, and by essences [Russell] |
| 14107 | Terms are identical if they belong to all the same classes [Russell] |
| 11849 | It at least makes sense to say two objects have all their properties in common [Wittgenstein on Russell] |
| 22303 | It makes no sense to say that a true proposition could have been false [Russell] |
| 18726 | For each necessity in the world there is an arbitrary rule of language [Wittgenstein] |
| 18712 | Understanding is translation, into action or into other symbols [Wittgenstein] |
| 4165 | Descartes found the true beginning of philosophy with the Cogito, in the consciousness of the individual [Schopenhauer] |
| 21923 | Schopenhauer can't use force/energy instead of 'will', because he is not a materialist [Lewis,PB on Schopenhauer] |
| 4162 | The world only exists in relation to something else, as an idea of the one who conceives it [Schopenhauer] |
| 21922 | We know reality because we know our own bodies and actions [Schopenhauer] |
| 21913 | Kant rightly separates appearance and thing-in-itself [Schopenhauer] |
| 4164 | Direct feeling of the senses are merely data; perception of the world comes with understanding causes [Schopenhauer] |
| 18280 | We live in sense-data, but talk about physical objects [Wittgenstein] |
| 18729 | Part of what we mean by stating the facts is the way we tend to experience them [Wittgenstein] |
| 4163 | All perception is intellectual [Schopenhauer] |
| 18734 | If you remember wrongly, then there must be some other criterion than your remembering [Wittgenstein] |
| 18721 | Explanation and understanding are the same [Wittgenstein] |
| 18720 | Explanation gives understanding by revealing the full multiplicity of the thing [Wittgenstein] |
| 18716 | A machine strikes us as being a rule of movement [Wittgenstein] |
| 18713 | If an explanation is good, the symbol is used properly in the future [Wittgenstein] |
| 4166 | A consciousness without an object is no consciousness [Schopenhauer] |
| 21369 | We have hidden and unadmitted desires and fears, suppressed because of vanity [Schopenhauer] |
| 21367 | I know both aspects of my body, as representation, and as will [Schopenhauer] |
| 4175 | It is as perverse to resent our individuality being replaced by others, as to resent the body renewing itself [Schopenhauer] |
| 4176 | We all regard ourselves a priori as free, but see from experience that character and motive compel us [Schopenhauer] |
| 4170 | Man's actions are not free, because they follow strictly from impact of motive on character [Schopenhauer] |
| 18717 | Thought is an activity which we perform by the expression of it [Wittgenstein] |
| 10583 | Abstraction principles identify a common property, which is some third term with the right relation [Russell] |
| 10582 | The principle of Abstraction says a symmetrical, transitive relation analyses into an identity [Russell] |
| 10584 | A certain type of property occurs if and only if there is an equivalence relation [Russell] |
| 18725 | A proposition draws a line around the facts which agree with it [Wittgenstein] |
| 18728 | The meaning of a proposition is the mode of its verification [Wittgenstein] |
| 18705 | Words function only in propositions, like levers in a machine [Wittgenstein] |
| 14110 | Proposition contain entities indicated by words, rather than the words themselves [Russell] |
| 18711 | A proposition is any expression which can be significantly negated [Wittgenstein] |
| 19164 | If propositions are facts, then false and true propositions are indistinguishable [Davidson on Russell] |
| 14111 | A proposition is a unity, and analysis destroys it [Russell] |
| 19157 | Russell said the proposition must explain its own unity - or else objective truth is impossible [Russell, by Davidson] |
| 4169 | Every true act of will is also at once and without exception a movement of the body [Schopenhauer] |
| 7187 | Schopenhauer was caught in Christian ideals, because he didn't deify his 'will' [Nietzsche on Schopenhauer] |
| 21365 | Only the will is thing-in-itself, seen both in blind nature and in human action [Schopenhauer] |
| 4173 | If we were essentially intellect rather than will, our moral worth would depend on imagined motives [Schopenhauer] |
| 21370 | Schopenhauer is a chief proponent of aesthetic experience as 'disinterested' [Schopenhauer, by Janaway] |
| 4182 | A principal pleasure of the beautiful is that it momentarily silences the will [Schopenhauer] |
| 21928 | The Sublime fights for will-less knowing, when faced with a beautiful threat to humanity [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB] |
| 21927 | Schopenhauer emphasises Ideas in art, unlike most romantics [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB] |
| 8116 | The will-less contemplation of art brings a liberation from selfhood [Schopenhauer, by Gardner] |
| 4174 | Man is more beautiful than anything else, and the loftiest purpose of art is to reveal his nature [Schopenhauer] |
| 21380 | The only aim of our existence is to grasp that non-existence would be better [Schopenhauer] |
| 21374 | We should no more expect ethical theory to produce good people than aesthetics to produce artists [Schopenhauer] |
| 4181 | Every good is essentially relative, for it has its essential nature only in its relation to a desiring will [Schopenhauer] |
| 5649 | Will casts aside each of its temporary fulfilments, so human life has no ultimate aim [Schopenhauer, by Scruton] |
| 4177 | Most people would probably choose non-existence at the end of their life, rather than relive the whole thing [Schopenhauer] |
| 4185 | Altruistic people make less distinction than usual between themselves and others [Schopenhauer] |
| 4183 | Only self-love can motivate morality, but that also makes it worthless [Schopenhauer] |
| 4172 | Happiness is the swift movement from desire to satisfaction, and then again on to desire [Schopenhauer] |
| 21371 | We can never attain happiness while our will is pursuing desires [Schopenhauer] |
| 4184 | Virtue must spring from an intuitive recognition that other people are essentially like us [Schopenhauer] |
| 4179 | The essence of nature is the will to life itself [Schopenhauer] |
| 14175 | We can drop 'cause', and just make inferences between facts [Russell] |
| 14172 | Moments and points seem to imply other moments and points, but don't cause them [Russell] |
| 14174 | The laws of motion and gravitation are just parts of the definition of a kind of matter [Russell] |
| 18733 | Laws of nature are an aspect of the phenomena, and are just our mode of description [Wittgenstein] |
| 14168 | Occupying a place and change are prior to motion, so motion is just occupying places at continuous times [Russell] |
| 14171 | Force is supposed to cause acceleration, but acceleration is a mathematical fiction [Russell] |
| 14160 | Space is the extension of 'point', and aggregates of points seem necessary for geometry [Russell] |
| 14156 | Mathematicians don't distinguish between instants of time and points on a line [Russell] |
| 14169 | The 'universe' can mean what exists now, what always has or will exist [Russell] |
| 4178 | Christianity is a pessimistic religion, in which the world is equated with evil [Schopenhauer] |
| 4180 | Religion is the mythical clothing of the truth which is inaccessible to the crude human intellect [Schopenhauer] |