41 ideas
| 6420 | Only by analysing is progress possible in philosophy [Russell] |
| 6432 | Analysis gives new knowledge, without destroying what we already have [Russell] |
| 18274 | Analysis complicates a statement, but only as far as the complexity of its meaning [Wittgenstein] |
| 6437 | The theory of types makes 'Socrates and killing are two' illegitimate [Russell] |
| 6442 | Truth belongs to beliefs, not to propositions and sentences [Russell] |
| 7548 | Classes, grouped by a convenient property, are logical constructions [Russell] |
| 6436 | I gradually replaced classes with properties, and they ended as a symbolic convenience [Russell] |
| 16908 | We can dispense with self-evidence, if language itself prevents logical mistakes [Jeshion on Wittgenstein] |
| 18276 | A statement's logical form derives entirely from its constituents [Wittgenstein] |
| 7528 | Leibniz bases everything on subject/predicate and substance/property propositions [Russell] |
| 6563 | 'And' and 'not' are non-referring terms, which do not represent anything [Wittgenstein, by Fogelin] |
| 6439 | Names are meaningless unless there is an object which they designate [Russell] |
| 6423 | We tried to define all of pure maths using logical premisses and concepts [Russell] |
| 6424 | Formalists say maths is merely conventional marks on paper, like the arbitrary rules of chess [Russell] |
| 6425 | Formalism can't apply numbers to reality, so it is an evasion [Russell] |
| 6426 | Intuitionism says propositions are only true or false if there is a method of showing it [Russell] |
| 6419 | In 1899-1900 I adopted the philosophy of logical atomism [Russell] |
| 6438 | Complex things can be known, but not simple things [Russell] |
| 23472 | The sense of propositions relies on the world's basic logical structure [Wittgenstein] |
| 7545 | Visible things are physical and external, but only exist when viewed [Russell] |
| 6434 | Facts are everything, except simples; they are either relations or qualities [Russell] |
| 6440 | Universals can't just be words, because words themselves are universals [Russell] |
| 6430 | In epistemology we should emphasis the continuity between animal and human minds [Russell] |
| 23500 | My main problem is the order of the world, and whether it is knowable a priori [Wittgenstein] |
| 7549 | If my body literally lost its mind, the object seen when I see a flash would still exist [Russell] |
| 7553 | Sense-data are purely physical [Russell] |
| 6441 | Pragmatism judges by effects, but I judge truth by causes [Russell] |
| 6431 | Empiricists seem unclear what they mean by 'experience' [Russell] |
| 6444 | True belief about the time is not knowledge if I luckily observe a stopped clock at the right moment [Russell] |
| 22323 | The philosophical I is the metaphysical subject, the limit - not a part of the world [Wittgenstein] |
| 7546 | A man is a succession of momentary men, bound by continuity and causation [Russell] |
| 6433 | Behaviourists struggle to explain memory and imagination, because they won't admit images [Russell] |
| 7550 | We could probably, in principle, infer minds from brains, and brains from minds [Russell] |
| 6443 | Surprise is a criterion of error [Russell] |
| 23481 | Propositions assemble a world experimentally, like the model of a road accident [Wittgenstein] |
| 6427 | Unverifiable propositions about the remote past are still either true or false [Russell] |
| 6435 | You can believe the meaning of a sentence without thinking of the words [Russell] |
| 4678 | Absolute prohibitions are the essence of ethics, and suicide is the most obvious example [Wittgenstein] |
| 7551 | Matter is a logical construction [Russell] |
| 7547 | Matter requires a division into time-corpuscles as well as space-corpuscles [Russell] |
| 7552 | Six dimensions are needed for a particular, three within its own space, and three to locate that space [Russell] |