Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Lectures 1930-32 (student notes)', 'Difficulties of Transfinite Numbers and Types' and 'Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed)'

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64 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 1. History of Philosophy
The history of philosophy only matters if the subject is a choice between rival theories [Wittgenstein]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / d. Philosophy as puzzles
Philosophy tries to be rid of certain intellectual puzzles, irrelevant to daily life [Wittgenstein]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
Philosophers express puzzlement, but don't clearly state the puzzle [Wittgenstein]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
We don't need a theory of truth, because we use the word perfectly well [Wittgenstein]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
We already know what we want to know, and analysis gives us no new facts [Wittgenstein]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 8. Category Mistake / a. Category mistakes
Words of the same kind can be substituted in a proposition without producing nonsense [Wittgenstein]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 8. Category Mistake / b. Category mistake as syntactic
Talking nonsense is not following the rules [Wittgenstein]
Grammar says that saying 'sound is red' is not false, but nonsense [Wittgenstein]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
There is no theory of truth, because it isn't a concept [Wittgenstein]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
All thought has the logical form of reality [Wittgenstein]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 6. Free Logic
Free logic is one of the few first-order non-classical logics [Priest,G]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 2. Mechanics of Set Theory / a. Symbols of ST
X1 x X2 x X3... x Xn indicates the 'cartesian product' of those sets [Priest,G]
<a,b&62; is a set whose members occur in the order shown [Priest,G]
a ∈ X says a is an object in set X; a ∉ X says a is not in X [Priest,G]
{x; A(x)} is a set of objects satisfying the condition A(x) [Priest,G]
{a1, a2, ...an} indicates that a set comprising just those objects [Priest,G]
Φ indicates the empty set, which has no members [Priest,G]
{a} is the 'singleton' set of a (not the object a itself) [Priest,G]
X⊂Y means set X is a 'proper subset' of set Y [Priest,G]
X⊆Y means set X is a 'subset' of set Y [Priest,G]
X = Y means the set X equals the set Y [Priest,G]
X ∩ Y indicates the 'intersection' of sets X and Y, the objects which are in both sets [Priest,G]
X∪Y indicates the 'union' of all the things in sets X and Y [Priest,G]
Y - X is the 'relative complement' of X with respect to Y; the things in Y that are not in X [Priest,G]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 2. Mechanics of Set Theory / b. Terminology of ST
The 'relative complement' is things in the second set not in the first [Priest,G]
The 'intersection' of two sets is a set of the things that are in both sets [Priest,G]
The 'union' of two sets is a set containing all the things in either of the sets [Priest,G]
The 'induction clause' says complex formulas retain the properties of their basic formulas [Priest,G]
A 'singleton' is a set with only one member [Priest,G]
A 'member' of a set is one of the objects in the set [Priest,G]
An 'ordered pair' (or ordered n-tuple) is a set with its members in a particular order [Priest,G]
A 'cartesian product' of sets is the set of all the n-tuples with one member in each of the sets [Priest,G]
A 'set' is a collection of objects [Priest,G]
The 'empty set' or 'null set' has no members [Priest,G]
A set is a 'subset' of another set if all of its members are in that set [Priest,G]
A 'proper subset' is smaller than the containing set [Priest,G]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 2. Mechanics of Set Theory / c. Basic theorems of ST
The empty set Φ is a subset of every set (including itself) [Priest,G]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
In logic nothing is hidden [Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 4. Logic by Convention
Laws of logic are like laws of chess - if you change them, it's just a different game [Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 3. Contradiction
Contradiction is between two rules, not between rule and reality [Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / c. not
We may correctly use 'not' without making the rule explicit [Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / d. and
Saying 'and' has meaning is just saying it works in a sentence [Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
A person's name doesn't mean their body; bodies don't sit down, and their existence can be denied [Wittgenstein]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
We don't get 'nearer' to something by adding decimals to 1.1412... (root-2) [Wittgenstein]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / a. The Infinite
Infinity is not a number, so doesn't say how many; it is the property of a law [Wittgenstein]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / d. Predicativism
'Predicative' norms are those which define a class [Russell]
We need rules for deciding which norms are predicative (unless none of them are) [Russell]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact
There are no positive or negative facts; these are just the forms of propositions [Wittgenstein]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 5. Universals as Concepts
Using 'green' is a commitment to future usage of 'green' [Wittgenstein]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 3. Necessity by Convention
For each necessity in the world there is an arbitrary rule of language [Wittgenstein]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
Understanding is translation, into action or into other symbols [Wittgenstein]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
We live in sense-data, but talk about physical objects [Wittgenstein]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems
Part of what we mean by stating the facts is the way we tend to experience them [Wittgenstein]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
If you remember wrongly, then there must be some other criterion than your remembering [Wittgenstein]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
Explanation and understanding are the same [Wittgenstein]
Explanation gives understanding by revealing the full multiplicity of the thing [Wittgenstein]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
A machine strikes us as being a rule of movement [Wittgenstein]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / a. Best explanation
If an explanation is good, the symbol is used properly in the future [Wittgenstein]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
Thought is an activity which we perform by the expression of it [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
A proposition draws a line around the facts which agree with it [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
The meaning of a proposition is the mode of its verification [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / a. Sentence meaning
Words function only in propositions, like levers in a machine [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
A proposition is any expression which can be significantly negated [Wittgenstein]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature
Laws of nature are an aspect of the phenomena, and are just our mode of description [Wittgenstein]