31 ideas
| 18274 | Analysis complicates a statement, but only as far as the complexity of its meaning [Wittgenstein] |
| 6161 | Structuralism is neo-Kantian idealism, with language playing the role of categories of understanding [Rowlands] |
| 16908 | We can dispense with self-evidence, if language itself prevents logical mistakes [Jeshion on Wittgenstein] |
| 6163 | If bivalence is rejected, then excluded middle must also be rejected [Rowlands] |
| 18276 | A statement's logical form derives entirely from its constituents [Wittgenstein] |
| 6563 | 'And' and 'not' are non-referring terms, which do not represent anything [Wittgenstein, by Fogelin] |
| 6155 | Supervenience is a one-way relation of dependence or determination between properties [Rowlands] |
| 23472 | The sense of propositions relies on the world's basic logical structure [Wittgenstein] |
| 6154 | It is argued that wholes possess modal and counterfactual properties that parts lack [Rowlands] |
| 6157 | Tokens are dated, concrete particulars; types are their general properties or kinds [Rowlands] |
| 6159 | Strong idealism is the sort of mess produced by a Cartesian separation of mind and world [Rowlands] |
| 23500 | My main problem is the order of the world, and whether it is knowable a priori [Wittgenstein] |
| 6152 | Minds are rational, conscious, subjective, self-knowing, free, meaningful and self-aware [Rowlands] |
| 6173 | Content externalism implies that we do not have privileged access to our own minds [Rowlands] |
| 6174 | If someone is secretly transported to Twin Earth, others know their thoughts better than they do [Rowlands] |
| 22323 | The philosophical I is the metaphysical subject, the limit - not a part of the world [Wittgenstein] |
| 6158 | Supervenience of mental and physical properties often comes with token-identity of mental and physical particulars [Rowlands] |
| 6168 | The content of a thought is just the meaning of a sentence [Rowlands] |
| 23481 | Propositions assemble a world experimentally, like the model of a road accident [Wittgenstein] |
| 6167 | Action is bodily movement caused by intentional states [Rowlands] |
| 22687 | Maybe literary assessment is evaluating the artist as a suitable friend [Gaut] |
| 22686 | Formalists say aesthetics concerns types of beauty, or unity, complexity and intensity [Gaut] |
| 22690 | 'Moralism' says all aesthetic merits are moral merits [Gaut] |
| 22684 | Good ethics counts towards aesthetic merit, and bad ethics counts against it [Gaut] |
| 22689 | If we don't respond ethically in the way a work prescribes, that is an aesthetic failure [Gaut] |
| 22685 | Good art does not necessarily improve people (any more than good advice does) [Gaut] |
| 6177 | Moral intuition seems unevenly distributed between people [Rowlands] |
| 4678 | Absolute prohibitions are the essence of ethics, and suicide is the most obvious example [Wittgenstein] |
| 6156 | The 17th century reintroduced atoms as mathematical modes of Euclidean space [Rowlands] |
| 6170 | Natural kinds are defined by their real essence, as in gold having atomic number 79 [Rowlands] |
| 6178 | It is common to see the value of nature in one feature, such as life, diversity, or integrity [Rowlands] |