96 ideas
18730 | The history of philosophy only matters if the subject is a choice between rival theories [Wittgenstein] |
19250 | Everything interesting should be recorded, with records that can be rearranged [Peirce] |
19228 | Sciences concern existence, but philosophy also concerns potential existence [Peirce] |
18704 | Philosophy tries to be rid of certain intellectual puzzles, irrelevant to daily life [Wittgenstein] |
19241 | An idea on its own isn't an idea, because they are continuous systems [Peirce] |
19227 | Philosophy is a search for real truth [Peirce] |
18710 | Philosophers express puzzlement, but don't clearly state the puzzle [Wittgenstein] |
19218 | Metaphysics is pointless without exact modern logic [Peirce] |
17275 | Realist metaphysics concerns what is real; naive metaphysics concerns natures of things [Fine,K] |
19229 | Metaphysics is the science of both experience, and its general laws and types [Peirce] |
19219 | Metaphysical reasoning is simple enough, but the concepts are very hard [Peirce] |
18732 | We don't need a theory of truth, because we use the word perfectly well [Wittgenstein] |
19231 | Metaphysics is turning into logic, and logic is becoming mathematics [Peirce] |
18714 | We already know what we want to know, and analysis gives us no new facts [Wittgenstein] |
18706 | Words of the same kind can be substituted in a proposition without producing nonsense [Wittgenstein] |
18735 | Talking nonsense is not following the rules [Wittgenstein] |
18719 | Grammar says that saying 'sound is red' is not false, but nonsense [Wittgenstein] |
18731 | There is no theory of truth, because it isn't a concept [Wittgenstein] |
19247 | The one unpardonable offence in reasoning is to block the route to further truth [Peirce] |
17282 | Truths need not always have their source in what exists [Fine,K] |
17283 | If the truth-making relation is modal, then modal truths will be grounded in anything [Fine,K] |
18707 | All thought has the logical form of reality [Wittgenstein] |
19246 | 'Holding for true' is either practical commitment, or provisional theory [Peirce] |
18724 | In logic nothing is hidden [Wittgenstein] |
17286 | Logical consequence is verification by a possible world within a truth-set [Fine,K] |
19237 | Deduction is true when the premises facts necessarily make the conclusion fact true [Peirce] |
19256 | Our research always hopes that reality embodies the logic we are employing [Peirce] |
18709 | Laws of logic are like laws of chess - if you change them, it's just a different game [Wittgenstein] |
18736 | Contradiction is between two rules, not between rule and reality [Wittgenstein] |
18723 | We may correctly use 'not' without making the rule explicit [Wittgenstein] |
18718 | Saying 'and' has meaning is just saying it works in a sentence [Wittgenstein] |
19238 | The logic of relatives relies on objects built of any relations (rather than on classes) [Peirce] |
18727 | A person's name doesn't mean their body; bodies don't sit down, and their existence can be denied [Wittgenstein] |
18738 | We don't get 'nearer' to something by adding decimals to 1.1412... (root-2) [Wittgenstein] |
18708 | Infinity is not a number, so doesn't say how many; it is the property of a law [Wittgenstein] |
19226 | We now know that mathematics only studies hypotheses, not facts [Peirce] |
17272 | 2+2=4 is necessary if it is snowing, but not true in virtue of the fact that it is snowing [Fine,K] |
17276 | If you say one thing causes another, that leaves open that the 'other' has its own distinct reality [Fine,K] |
17284 | An immediate ground is the next lower level, which gives the concept of a hierarchy [Fine,K] |
17285 | 'Strict' ground moves down the explanations, but 'weak' ground can move sideways [Fine,K] |
17288 | We learn grounding from what is grounded, not what does the grounding [Fine,K] |
17281 | If grounding is a relation it must be between entities of the same type, preferably between facts [Fine,K] |
17280 | Ground is best understood as a sentence operator, rather than a relation between predicates [Fine,K] |
17290 | Only metaphysical grounding must be explained by essence [Fine,K] |
17274 | Philosophical explanation is largely by ground (just as cause is used in science) [Fine,K] |
17278 | We can only explain how a reduction is possible if we accept the concept of ground [Fine,K] |
19240 | Realism is the belief that there is something in the being of things corresponding to our reasoning [Peirce] |
19239 | There may be no reality; it's just our one desperate hope of knowing anything [Peirce] |
17287 | Facts, such as redness and roundness of a ball, can be 'fused' into one fact [Fine,K] |
18737 | There are no positive or negative facts; these are just the forms of propositions [Wittgenstein] |
18715 | Using 'green' is a commitment to future usage of 'green' [Wittgenstein] |
17279 | Even a three-dimensionalist might identify temporal parts, in their thinking [Fine,K] |
19252 | Objective chance is the property of a distribution [Peirce] |
19232 | In ordinary language a conditional statement assumes that the antecedent is true [Peirce] |
17273 | Each basic modality has its 'own' explanatory relation [Fine,K] |
17289 | Every necessary truth is grounded in the nature of something [Fine,K] |
18726 | For each necessity in the world there is an arbitrary rule of language [Wittgenstein] |
18712 | Understanding is translation, into action or into other symbols [Wittgenstein] |
19223 | We act on 'full belief' in a crisis, but 'opinion' only operates for trivial actions [Peirce] |
18280 | We live in sense-data, but talk about physical objects [Wittgenstein] |
18729 | Part of what we mean by stating the facts is the way we tend to experience them [Wittgenstein] |
19253 | We talk of 'association by resemblance' but that is wrong: the association constitutes the resemblance [Peirce] |
18734 | If you remember wrongly, then there must be some other criterion than your remembering [Wittgenstein] |
19224 | Scientists will give up any conclusion, if experience opposes it [Peirce] |
19243 | If each inference slightly reduced our certainty, science would soon be in trouble [Peirce] |
19225 | I classify science by level of abstraction; principles derive from above, and data from below [Peirce] |
19234 | 'Induction' doesn't capture Greek 'epagoge', which is singulars in a mass producing the general [Peirce] |
19235 | How does induction get started? [Peirce] |
19236 | Induction can never prove that laws have no exceptions [Peirce] |
19251 | The worst fallacy in induction is generalising one recondite property from a sample [Peirce] |
18721 | Explanation and understanding are the same [Wittgenstein] |
18720 | Explanation gives understanding by revealing the full multiplicity of the thing [Wittgenstein] |
17291 | We explain by identity (what it is), or by truth (how things are) [Fine,K] |
17271 | Is there metaphysical explanation (as well as causal), involving a constitutive form of determination? [Fine,K] |
18716 | A machine strikes us as being a rule of movement [Wittgenstein] |
18713 | If an explanation is good, the symbol is used properly in the future [Wittgenstein] |
19222 | Men often answer inner 'whys' by treating unconscious instincts as if they were reasons [Peirce] |
19220 | We may think animals reason very little, but they hardly ever make mistakes! [Peirce] |
19255 | Generalisation is the great law of mind [Peirce] |
19242 | Generalization is the true end of life [Peirce] |
19249 | 'Know yourself' is not introspection; it is grasping how others see you [Peirce] |
19257 | Whatever is First must be sentient [Peirce] |
17277 | If mind supervenes on the physical, it may also explain the physical (and not vice versa) [Fine,K] |
18717 | Thought is an activity which we perform by the expression of it [Wittgenstein] |
19248 | Reasoning involves observation, experiment, and habituation [Peirce] |
19221 | Everybody overrates their own reasoning, so it is clearly superficial [Peirce] |
18725 | A proposition draws a line around the facts which agree with it [Wittgenstein] |
18728 | The meaning of a proposition is the mode of its verification [Wittgenstein] |
18705 | Words function only in propositions, like levers in a machine [Wittgenstein] |
19233 | Indexicals are unusual words, because they stimulate the hearer to look around [Peirce] |
18711 | A proposition is any expression which can be significantly negated [Wittgenstein] |
19230 | People should follow what lies before them, and is within their power [Peirce] |
19245 | We are not inspired by other people's knowledge; a sense of our ignorance motivates study [Peirce] |
19244 | Chemists rely on a single experiment to establish a fact; repetition is pointless [Peirce] |
19254 | Our laws of nature may be the result of evolution [Peirce] |
18733 | Laws of nature are an aspect of the phenomena, and are just our mode of description [Wittgenstein] |