15 ideas
| 7085 | The main problem of philosophy is what can and cannot be thought and expressed [Wittgenstein, by Grayling] |
| 19081 | Coherence with a set of propositions suggests we can know the proposition corresponds [Davidson, by Donnellan] |
| 23463 | Atomic facts correspond to true elementary propositions [Wittgenstein] |
| 8806 | The concepts of belief and truth are linked, since beliefs are meant to fit reality [Davidson] |
| 8252 | Davidson believes experience is non-conceptual, and outside the space of reasons [Davidson, by McDowell] |
| 8255 | Davidson says the world influences us causally; I say it influences us rationally [McDowell on Davidson] |
| 8804 | Reasons for beliefs are not the same as evidence [Davidson] |
| 8802 | Sensations lack the content to be logical; they cause beliefs, but they cannot justify them [Davidson] |
| 8801 | Coherent justification says only beliefs can be reasons for holding other beliefs [Davidson] |
| 8805 | Skepticism is false because our utterances agree, because they are caused by the same objects [Davidson] |
| 7522 | A full neural account of qualia will give new epistemic access to them, beyond private experience [Churchlands] |
| 7521 | It is question-begging to assume that qualia are totally simple, hence irreducible [Churchlands] |
| 7523 | The qualia Hard Problem is easy, in comparison with the co-ordination of mental states [Churchlands] |
| 23490 | A thought is mental constituents that relate to reality as words do [Wittgenstein] |
| 18703 | Davidson's Cogito: 'I think, therefore I am generally right' [Davidson, by Button] |