118 ideas
2512 | Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language [Wittgenstein] |
4148 | What is your aim in philosophy? - To show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle [Wittgenstein] |
22490 | Bring words back from metaphysics to everyday use [Wittgenstein] |
3807 | Reason is and ought to be the slave of the passions [Hume] |
6566 | The problem is to explain the role of contradiction in social life [Wittgenstein] |
18743 | Wittgenstein says we want the grammar of problems, not their first-order logical structure [Wittgenstein, by Horsten/Pettigrew] |
4139 | Naming is a preparation for description [Wittgenstein] |
4946 | A name is not determined by a description, but by a cluster or family [Wittgenstein, by Kripke] |
8649 | Two numbers are equal if all of their units correspond to one another [Hume] |
21291 | There is no medium state between existence and non-existence [Hume] |
11942 | Power is the possibility of action, as discovered by experience [Hume] |
11949 | There may well be powers in things, with which we are quite unacquainted [Hume] |
11950 | We have no idea of powers, because we have no impressions of them [Hume] |
11941 | The distinction between a power and its exercise is entirely frivolous [Hume] |
11098 | Momentary impressions are wrongly identified with one another on the basis of resemblance [Hume, by Quine] |
7954 | If we see a resemblance among objects, we apply the same name to them, despite their differences [Hume] |
21293 | Individuation is only seeing that a thing is stable and continuous over time [Hume] |
12048 | The only meaning we have for substance is a collection of qualities [Hume] |
13424 | Aristotelians propose accidents supported by substance, but they don't understand either of them [Hume] |
15106 | Essence is expressed by grammar [Wittgenstein] |
21300 | A change more obviously destroys an identity if it is quick and observed [Hume] |
21299 | Changing a part can change the whole, not absolutely, but by its proportion of the whole [Hume] |
1321 | If identity survives change or interruption, then resemblance, contiguity or causation must unite the parts of it [Hume] |
1330 | If a republic can retain identity through many changes, so can an individual [Hume] |
12295 | 3-D says things are stretched in space but not in time, and entire at a time but not at a location [Fine,K] |
12298 | Genuine motion, rather than variation of position, requires the 'entire presence' of the object [Fine,K] |
12296 | 4-D says things are stretched in space and in time, and not entire at a time or at a location [Fine,K] |
18882 | You can ask when the wedding was, but not (usually) when the bride was [Fine,K, by Simons] |
12297 | Three-dimensionalist can accept temporal parts, as things enduring only for an instant [Fine,K] |
21302 | If a ruined church is rebuilt, its relation to its parish makes it the same church [Hume] |
21303 | We accept the identity of a river through change, because it is the river's nature [Hume] |
21301 | The purpose of the ship makes it the same one through all variations [Hume] |
21290 | Multiple objects cannot convey identity, because we see them as different [Hume] |
1207 | Both number and unity are incompatible with the relation of identity [Hume] |
21289 | 'An object is the same with itself' is meaningless; it expresses unity, not identity [Hume] |
21292 | Saying an object is the same with itself is only meaningful over a period of time [Hume] |
9428 | Nothing we clearly imagine is absolutely impossible [Hume] |
4766 | Necessity only exists in the mind, and not in objects [Hume] |
6600 | The belief that fire burns is like the fear that it burns [Wittgenstein] |
6526 | Hume says objects are not a construction, but an imaginative leap [Hume, by Robinson,H] |
4153 | Are sense-data the material of which the universe is made? [Wittgenstein] |
6501 | As sense-data are necessarily private, they are attacked by Wittgenstein's objections [Wittgenstein, by Robinson,H] |
6489 | Associationism results from having to explain intentionality just with sense-data [Robinson,H on Hume] |
6182 | Even Hume didn't include mathematics in his empiricism [Hume, by Kant] |
11079 | How do I decide when to accept or obey an intuition? [Wittgenstein] |
12417 | Mathematicians only accept their own proofs when everyone confims them [Hume] |
5548 | Hume became a total sceptic, because he believed that reason was a deception [Hume, by Kant] |
4160 | One can mistrust one's own senses, but not one's own beliefs [Wittgenstein] |
7446 | The idea of inductive evidence, around 1660, made Hume's problem possible [Hume, by Hacking] |
19273 | I don't have the opinion that people have minds; I just treat them as such [Wittgenstein] |
5663 | It is irresponsible to generalise from my own case of pain to other people's [Wittgenstein] |
19272 | To imagine another's pain by my own, I must imagine a pain I don't feel, by one I do feel [Wittgenstein] |
4161 | If a lion could talk, we could not understand him [Wittgenstein] |
7392 | If a lion could talk, it would be nothing like other lions [Dennett on Wittgenstein] |
21806 | Memory, senses and understanding are all founded on the imagination [Hume] |
3819 | Hume's 'bundle' won't distinguish one mind with ten experiences from ten minds [Searle on Hume] |
1317 | A person is just a fast-moving bundle of perceptions [Hume] |
1331 | The parts of a person are always linked together by causation [Hume] |
1388 | Hume gives us an interesting sketchy causal theory of personal identity [Perry on Hume] |
21297 | A person is simply a bundle of continually fluctuating perceptions [Hume] |
5676 | To say that I 'know' I am in pain means nothing more than that I AM in pain [Wittgenstein] |
1316 | Introspection always discovers perceptions, and never a Self without perceptions [Hume] |
1333 | Memory only reveals personal identity, by showing cause and effect [Hume] |
1332 | We use memory to infer personal actions we have since forgotten [Hume] |
21305 | Memory not only reveals identity, but creates it, by producing resemblances [Hume] |
21307 | Who thinks that because you have forgotten an incident you are no longer that person? [Hume] |
21306 | Causation unites our perceptions, by producing, destroying and modifying each other [Hume] |
21294 | A continuous lifelong self must be justified by a single sustained impression, which we don't have [Hume] |
21295 | When I introspect I can only observe my perceptions, and never a self which has them [Hume] |
21298 | We pretend our perceptions are continuous, and imagine a self to fill the gaps [Hume] |
21304 | Identity in the mind is a fiction, like that fiction that plants and animals stay the same [Hume] |
4154 | Why are we not aware of the huge gap between mind and brain in ordinary life? [Wittgenstein] |
4158 | An 'inner process' stands in need of outward criteria [Wittgenstein] |
6165 | Every course of action can either accord or conflict with a rule, so there is no accord or conflict [Wittgenstein] |
4143 | One cannot obey a rule 'privately', because that is a practice, not the same as thinking one is obeying [Wittgenstein] |
7092 | If individuals can't tell if they are following a rule, how does a community do it? [Grayling on Wittgenstein] |
4138 | Is white simple, or does it consist of the colours of the rainbow? [Wittgenstein] |
7055 | Externalist accounts of mental content begin in Wittgenstein [Wittgenstein, by Heil] |
12576 | Possessing a concept is knowing how to go on [Wittgenstein, by Peacocke] |
4157 | Concepts direct our interests and investigations, and express those interests [Wittgenstein] |
12606 | Man learns the concept of the past by remembering [Wittgenstein] |
4141 | Various games have a 'family resemblance', as their similarities overlap and criss-cross [Wittgenstein] |
23450 | Wittgenstein rejected his earlier view that the form of language is the form of the world [Wittgenstein, by Morris,M] |
4150 | Asking about verification is only one way of asking about the meaning of a proposition [Wittgenstein] |
6567 | For Wittgenstein, words are defined by their use, just as chess pieces are [Wittgenstein, by Fogelin] |
6169 | We do not achieve meaning and understanding in our heads, but in the world [Wittgenstein, by Rowlands] |
4155 | We all seem able to see quite clearly how sentences represent things when we use them [Wittgenstein] |
4137 | In the majority of cases the meaning of a word is its use in the language [Wittgenstein] |
4142 | To understand a sentence means to understand a language [Wittgenstein] |
4149 | We don't have 'meanings' in our minds in addition to verbal expressions [Wittgenstein] |
4156 | Make the following experiment: say "It's cold here" and mean "It's warm here" [Wittgenstein] |
4145 | How do words refer to sensations? [Wittgenstein] |
4140 | The standard metre in Paris is neither one metre long nor not one metre long [Wittgenstein] |
6166 | Was Wittgenstein's problem between individual and community, or between occasions for an individual? [Rowlands on Wittgenstein] |
7875 | If a brilliant child invented a name for a private sensation, it couldn't communicate it [Wittgenstein] |
4146 | We cannot doublecheck mental images for correctness (or confirm news with many copies of the paper) [Wittgenstein] |
4147 | If we only named pain by our own case, it would be like naming beetles by looking in a private box [Wittgenstein] |
5659 | If the reference is private, that is incompatible with the sense being public [Wittgenstein, by Scruton] |
4152 | Getting from perceptions to words cannot be a private matter; the rules need an institution of use [Wittgenstein] |
4136 | To imagine a language means to imagine a form of life [Wittgenstein] |
4144 | Common human behaviour enables us to interpret an unknown language [Wittgenstein] |
11049 | To communicate, language needs agreement in judgment as well as definition [Wittgenstein] |
20030 | If one event causes another, the two events must be wholly distinct [Hume, by Wilson/Schpall] |
6658 | What is left over if I subtract my arm going up from my raising my arm? [Wittgenstein] |
6692 | For Hume, practical reason has little force, because we can always modify our desires [Hume, by Graham] |
8257 | Reason alone can never be a motive to any action of the will [Hume] |
22374 | You can only hold people responsible for actions which arise out of their character [Hume] |
22382 | We cannot discover vice by studying a wilful murder; that only arises from our own feelings [Hume] |
4008 | Modern science has destroyed the Platonic synthesis of scientific explanation and morality [Hume, by Taylor,C] |
8067 | The problem of getting to 'ought' from 'is' would also apply in getting to 'owes' or 'needs' [Anscombe on Hume] |
4578 | You can't move from 'is' to 'ought' without giving some explanation or reason for the deduction [Hume] |
3650 | Total selfishness is not irrational [Hume] |
14301 | We have no good concept of solidity or matter, because accounts of them are all circular [Hume] |
8382 | For Hume a constant conjunction is both necessary and sufficient for causation [Hume, by Crane] |
19274 | Hume seems to presuppose necessary connections between mental events [Kripke on Hume] |
4151 | Grammar tells what kind of object anything is - and theology is a kind of grammar [Wittgenstein] |
21296 | If all of my perceptions were removed by death, nothing more is needed for total annihilation [Hume] |
4159 | The human body is the best picture of the human soul [Wittgenstein] |