52 ideas
18730 | The history of philosophy only matters if the subject is a choice between rival theories [Wittgenstein] |
18704 | Philosophy tries to be rid of certain intellectual puzzles, irrelevant to daily life [Wittgenstein] |
18710 | Philosophers express puzzlement, but don't clearly state the puzzle [Wittgenstein] |
18732 | We don't need a theory of truth, because we use the word perfectly well [Wittgenstein] |
18714 | We already know what we want to know, and analysis gives us no new facts [Wittgenstein] |
18706 | Words of the same kind can be substituted in a proposition without producing nonsense [Wittgenstein] |
18719 | Grammar says that saying 'sound is red' is not false, but nonsense [Wittgenstein] |
18735 | Talking nonsense is not following the rules [Wittgenstein] |
18731 | There is no theory of truth, because it isn't a concept [Wittgenstein] |
18707 | All thought has the logical form of reality [Wittgenstein] |
19100 | Truth makes disagreements matter, or worth settling [Misak] |
19094 | For pragmatists the loftiest idea of truth is just a feature of what remains forever assertible [Misak] |
19099 | 'True' is used for emphasis, clarity, assertion, comparison, objectivity, meaning, negation, consequence... [Misak] |
19103 | 'That's true' doesn't just refer back to a sentence, but implies sustained evidence for it [Misak] |
19105 | Truth isn't a grand elusive property, if it is just the aim of our assertions and inquiries [Misak] |
19108 | Truth is proper assertion, but that has varying standards [Misak] |
19101 | Disquotation is bivalent [Misak] |
19106 | Disquotations says truth is assertion, and assertion proclaims truth - but what is 'assertion'? [Misak] |
19096 | Disquotationalism resembles a telephone directory [Misak] |
19098 | Deflating the correspondence theory doesn't entail deflating all the other theories [Misak] |
19104 | Deflationism isn't a theory of truth, but an account of its role in natural language [Misak] |
18724 | In logic nothing is hidden [Wittgenstein] |
18709 | Laws of logic are like laws of chess - if you change them, it's just a different game [Wittgenstein] |
18736 | Contradiction is between two rules, not between rule and reality [Wittgenstein] |
18723 | We may correctly use 'not' without making the rule explicit [Wittgenstein] |
18718 | Saying 'and' has meaning is just saying it works in a sentence [Wittgenstein] |
18727 | A person's name doesn't mean their body; bodies don't sit down, and their existence can be denied [Wittgenstein] |
18738 | We don't get 'nearer' to something by adding decimals to 1.1412... (root-2) [Wittgenstein] |
18708 | Infinity is not a number, so doesn't say how many; it is the property of a law [Wittgenstein] |
19109 | The anti-realism debate concerns whether indefeasibility is a plausible aim of inquiry [Misak] |
18737 | There are no positive or negative facts; these are just the forms of propositions [Wittgenstein] |
18715 | Using 'green' is a commitment to future usage of 'green' [Wittgenstein] |
18726 | For each necessity in the world there is an arbitrary rule of language [Wittgenstein] |
18415 | The actual world is just the world you are in [Lewis, by Cappelen/Dever] |
18712 | Understanding is translation, into action or into other symbols [Wittgenstein] |
16392 | A content is a property, and believing it is self-ascribing that property [Lewis, by Recanati] |
18280 | We live in sense-data, but talk about physical objects [Wittgenstein] |
18729 | Part of what we mean by stating the facts is the way we tend to experience them [Wittgenstein] |
18734 | If you remember wrongly, then there must be some other criterion than your remembering [Wittgenstein] |
18721 | Explanation and understanding are the same [Wittgenstein] |
18720 | Explanation gives understanding by revealing the full multiplicity of the thing [Wittgenstein] |
18716 | A machine strikes us as being a rule of movement [Wittgenstein] |
18713 | If an explanation is good, the symbol is used properly in the future [Wittgenstein] |
18717 | Thought is an activity which we perform by the expression of it [Wittgenstein] |
18416 | Attitudes involve properties (not propositions), and belief is self-ascribing the properties [Lewis, by Solomon] |
16390 | Lewis's popular centred worlds approach gives an attitude an index of world, subject and time [Lewis, by Recanati] |
18725 | A proposition draws a line around the facts which agree with it [Wittgenstein] |
18418 | A theory of perspectival de se content gives truth conditions relative to an agent [Lewis, by Cappelen/Dever] |
18728 | The meaning of a proposition is the mode of its verification [Wittgenstein] |
18705 | Words function only in propositions, like levers in a machine [Wittgenstein] |
18711 | A proposition is any expression which can be significantly negated [Wittgenstein] |
18733 | Laws of nature are an aspect of the phenomena, and are just our mode of description [Wittgenstein] |