22 ideas
| 18274 | Analysis complicates a statement, but only as far as the complexity of its meaning [Wittgenstein] |
| 8349 | The best way to do ontology is to make sense of our normal talk [Davidson] |
| 16908 | We can dispense with self-evidence, if language itself prevents logical mistakes [Jeshion on Wittgenstein] |
| 18276 | A statement's logical form derives entirely from its constituents [Wittgenstein] |
| 6563 | 'And' and 'not' are non-referring terms, which do not represent anything [Wittgenstein, by Fogelin] |
| 8348 | If we don't assume that events exist, we cannot make sense of our common talk [Davidson] |
| 23472 | The sense of propositions relies on the world's basic logical structure [Wittgenstein] |
| 23500 | My main problem is the order of the world, and whether it is knowable a priori [Wittgenstein] |
| 8347 | Explanations typically relate statements, not events [Davidson] |
| 8329 | Either causal relations are given in experience, or they are unobserved and theoretical [Sosa/Tooley] |
| 22323 | The philosophical I is the metaphysical subject, the limit - not a part of the world [Wittgenstein] |
| 23481 | Propositions assemble a world experimentally, like the model of a road accident [Wittgenstein] |
| 4678 | Absolute prohibitions are the essence of ethics, and suicide is the most obvious example [Wittgenstein] |
| 10371 | Distinguish causation, which is in the world, from explanations, which depend on descriptions [Davidson, by Schaffer,J] |
| 8324 | The problem is to explain how causal laws and relations connect, and how they link to the world [Sosa/Tooley] |
| 8328 | Causation isn't energy transfer, because an electron is caused by previous temporal parts [Sosa/Tooley] |
| 8327 | If direction of causation is just direction of energy transfer, that seems to involve causation [Sosa/Tooley] |
| 8403 | Either facts, or highly unspecific events, serve better as causes than concrete events [Field,H on Davidson] |
| 8346 | Full descriptions can demonstrate sufficiency of cause, but not necessity [Davidson] |
| 8330 | Are causes sufficient for the event, or necessary, or both? [Sosa/Tooley] |
| 4778 | A singular causal statement is true if it is held to fall under a law [Davidson, by Psillos] |
| 8325 | The dominant view is that causal laws are prior; a minority say causes can be explained singly [Sosa/Tooley] |