Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Notebooks 1914-1916', 'What Mary Didn't Know' and 'On Propositions: What they are, and Meaning'

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21 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
18274 Analysis complicates a statement, but only as far as the complexity of its meaning [Wittgenstein]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
5784 In its primary and formal sense, 'true' applies to propositions, not beliefs [Russell]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 1. For Truthmakers
5777 The truth or falsehood of a belief depends upon a fact to which the belief 'refers' [Russell]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
5783 Propositions of existence, generalities, disjunctions and hypotheticals make correspondence tricky [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
16908 We can dispense with self-evidence, if language itself prevents logical mistakes [Jeshion on Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
18276 A statement's logical form derives entirely from its constituents [Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
6563 'And' and 'not' are non-referring terms, which do not represent anything [Wittgenstein, by Fogelin]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / d. Logical atoms
23472 The sense of propositions relies on the world's basic logical structure [Wittgenstein]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / b. Elements of beliefs
5780 The three questions about belief are its contents, its success, and its character [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 5. A Priori Synthetic
23500 My main problem is the order of the world, and whether it is knowable a priori [Wittgenstein]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia
4894 I say Mary does not have new knowledge, but knows an old fact in a new way [Perry on Jackson]
4895 Is it unfair that physicalist knowledge can be written down, but dualist knowledge can't be [Perry on Jackson]
4886 Mary knows all the physical facts of seeing red, but experiencing it is new knowledge [Jackson]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
22323 The philosophical I is the metaphysical subject, the limit - not a part of the world [Wittgenstein]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
5778 If we object to all data which is 'introspective' we will cease to believe in toothaches [Russell]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
5779 There are distinct sets of psychological and physical causal laws [Russell]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
23481 Propositions assemble a world experimentally, like the model of a road accident [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
5781 Our important beliefs all, if put into words, take the form of propositions [Russell]
5782 A proposition expressed in words is a 'word-proposition', and one of images an 'image-proposition' [Russell]
5776 A proposition is what we believe when we believe truly or falsely [Russell]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 4. Suicide
4678 Absolute prohibitions are the essence of ethics, and suicide is the most obvious example [Wittgenstein]