19 ideas
18274 | Analysis complicates a statement, but only as far as the complexity of its meaning [Wittgenstein] |
3745 | Must sentences make statements to qualify for truth? [O'Connor] |
3742 | Beliefs must match facts, but also words must match beliefs [O'Connor] |
3744 | The semantic theory requires sentences as truth-bearers, not propositions [O'Connor] |
3749 | What does 'true in English' mean? [O'Connor] |
16908 | We can dispense with self-evidence, if language itself prevents logical mistakes [Jeshion on Wittgenstein] |
3746 | Logic seems to work for unasserted sentences [O'Connor] |
18276 | A statement's logical form derives entirely from its constituents [Wittgenstein] |
6563 | 'And' and 'not' are non-referring terms, which do not represent anything [Wittgenstein, by Fogelin] |
3747 | Events are fast changes which are of interest to us [O'Connor] |
23472 | The sense of propositions relies on the world's basic logical structure [Wittgenstein] |
3743 | We can't contemplate our beliefs until we have expressed them [O'Connor] |
3748 | Without language our beliefs are particular and present [O'Connor] |
23500 | My main problem is the order of the world, and whether it is knowable a priori [Wittgenstein] |
3364 | All mental phenomena contain an object [Brentano] |
3225 | Mental unity suggests that qualia and intentionality must connect [Brentano, by Rey] |
22323 | The philosophical I is the metaphysical subject, the limit - not a part of the world [Wittgenstein] |
23481 | Propositions assemble a world experimentally, like the model of a road accident [Wittgenstein] |
4678 | Absolute prohibitions are the essence of ethics, and suicide is the most obvious example [Wittgenstein] |