62 ideas
18730 | The history of philosophy only matters if the subject is a choice between rival theories [Wittgenstein] |
18704 | Philosophy tries to be rid of certain intellectual puzzles, irrelevant to daily life [Wittgenstein] |
18710 | Philosophers express puzzlement, but don't clearly state the puzzle [Wittgenstein] |
18732 | We don't need a theory of truth, because we use the word perfectly well [Wittgenstein] |
18714 | We already know what we want to know, and analysis gives us no new facts [Wittgenstein] |
22216 | Phenomenology studies different types of correlation between consciousness and its objects [Husserl, by Bernet] |
21217 | Phenomenology needs absolute reflection, without presuppositions [Husserl] |
22218 | There can only be a science of fluctuating consciousness if it focuses on stable essences [Husserl, by Bernet] |
22217 | Phenomenology aims to validate objects, on the basis of intentional intuitive experience [Husserl, by Bernet] |
22219 | Husserl saw transcendental phenomenology as idealist, in its construction of objects [Husserl, by Bernet] |
22204 | Start philosophising with no preconceptions, from the intuitively non-theoretical self-given [Husserl] |
22207 | Epoché or 'bracketing' is refraining from judgement, even when some truths are certain [Husserl] |
22208 | 'Bracketing' means no judgements at all about spatio-temporal existence [Husserl] |
22210 | After everything is bracketed, consciousness still has a unique being of its own [Husserl] |
22215 | Phenomenology describes consciousness, in the light of pure experiences [Husserl] |
22201 | The use of mathematical-style definitions in philosophy is fruitless and harmful [Husserl] |
18706 | Words of the same kind can be substituted in a proposition without producing nonsense [Wittgenstein] |
18735 | Talking nonsense is not following the rules [Wittgenstein] |
18719 | Grammar says that saying 'sound is red' is not false, but nonsense [Wittgenstein] |
18731 | There is no theory of truth, because it isn't a concept [Wittgenstein] |
18707 | All thought has the logical form of reality [Wittgenstein] |
18724 | In logic nothing is hidden [Wittgenstein] |
18709 | Laws of logic are like laws of chess - if you change them, it's just a different game [Wittgenstein] |
18736 | Contradiction is between two rules, not between rule and reality [Wittgenstein] |
18723 | We may correctly use 'not' without making the rule explicit [Wittgenstein] |
18718 | Saying 'and' has meaning is just saying it works in a sentence [Wittgenstein] |
18727 | A person's name doesn't mean their body; bodies don't sit down, and their existence can be denied [Wittgenstein] |
18738 | We don't get 'nearer' to something by adding decimals to 1.1412... (root-2) [Wittgenstein] |
18708 | Infinity is not a number, so doesn't say how many; it is the property of a law [Wittgenstein] |
22209 | Our goal is to reveal a new hidden region of Being [Husserl] |
22211 | As a thing and its perception are separated, two modes of Being emerge [Husserl] |
22202 | The World is all experiencable objects [Husserl] |
22213 | Absolute reality is an absurdity [Husserl] |
18737 | There are no positive or negative facts; these are just the forms of propositions [Wittgenstein] |
21342 | A relation is internal if two things possessing the relation could not fail to be related [Moore,GE, by Heil] |
18715 | Using 'green' is a commitment to future usage of 'green' [Wittgenstein] |
21218 | The sense of anything contingent has a purely apprehensible essence or Eidos [Husserl] |
19263 | Imagine an object's properties varying; the ones that won't vary are the essential ones [Husserl, by Vaidya] |
18726 | For each necessity in the world there is an arbitrary rule of language [Wittgenstein] |
18712 | Understanding is translation, into action or into other symbols [Wittgenstein] |
21220 | The physical given, unlike the mental given, could be non-existing [Husserl] |
22205 | Feelings of self-evidence (and necessity) are just the inventions of theory [Husserl] |
18280 | We live in sense-data, but talk about physical objects [Wittgenstein] |
18729 | Part of what we mean by stating the facts is the way we tend to experience them [Wittgenstein] |
21221 | Direct 'seeing' by consciousness is the ultimate rational legitimation [Husserl] |
22220 | The phenomena of memory are given in the present, but as being past [Husserl, by Bernet] |
18734 | If you remember wrongly, then there must be some other criterion than your remembering [Wittgenstein] |
22206 | Natural science has become great by just ignoring ancient scepticism [Husserl] |
18721 | Explanation and understanding are the same [Wittgenstein] |
18720 | Explanation gives understanding by revealing the full multiplicity of the thing [Wittgenstein] |
18716 | A machine strikes us as being a rule of movement [Wittgenstein] |
18713 | If an explanation is good, the symbol is used properly in the future [Wittgenstein] |
22221 | We know another's mind via bodily expression, while also knowing it is inaccessible [Husserl, by Bernet] |
22212 | Pure consciousness is a sealed off system of actual Being [Husserl] |
22214 | We never meet the Ego, as part of experience, or as left over from experience [Husserl] |
18717 | Thought is an activity which we perform by the expression of it [Wittgenstein] |
18725 | A proposition draws a line around the facts which agree with it [Wittgenstein] |
18728 | The meaning of a proposition is the mode of its verification [Wittgenstein] |
18705 | Words function only in propositions, like levers in a machine [Wittgenstein] |
18711 | A proposition is any expression which can be significantly negated [Wittgenstein] |
22203 | Only facts follow from facts [Husserl] |
18733 | Laws of nature are an aspect of the phenomena, and are just our mode of description [Wittgenstein] |