29 ideas
18274 | Analysis complicates a statement, but only as far as the complexity of its meaning [Wittgenstein] |
8868 | Objective truth arises from interpersonal communication [Davidson] |
18806 | Frege thought traditional categories had psychological and linguistic impurities [Frege, by Rumfitt] |
16908 | We can dispense with self-evidence, if language itself prevents logical mistakes [Jeshion on Wittgenstein] |
18276 | A statement's logical form derives entirely from its constituents [Wittgenstein] |
6563 | 'And' and 'not' are non-referring terms, which do not represent anything [Wittgenstein, by Fogelin] |
8490 | First-level functions have objects as arguments; second-level functions take functions as arguments [Frege] |
8492 | Relations are functions with two arguments [Frege] |
8487 | Arithmetic is a development of logic, so arithmetical symbolism must expand into logical symbolism [Frege] |
18899 | Frege takes the existence of horses to be part of their concept [Frege, by Sommers] |
23472 | The sense of propositions relies on the world's basic logical structure [Wittgenstein] |
4028 | Frege allows either too few properties (as extensions) or too many (as predicates) [Mellor/Oliver on Frege] |
8489 | The concept 'object' is too simple for analysis; unlike a function, it is an expression with no empty place [Frege] |
8867 | A belief requires understanding the distinctions of true-and-false, and appearance-and-reality [Davidson] |
23500 | My main problem is the order of the world, and whether it is knowable a priori [Wittgenstein] |
10347 | Objectivity is intersubjectivity [Davidson] |
8866 | If we know other minds through behaviour, but not our own, we should assume they aren't like me [Davidson] |
10346 | Knowing other minds rests on knowing both one's own mind and the external world [Davidson, by Dummett] |
22323 | The philosophical I is the metaphysical subject, the limit - not a part of the world [Wittgenstein] |
9947 | Concepts are the ontological counterparts of predicative expressions [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
10319 | An assertion about the concept 'horse' must indirectly speak of an object [Frege, by Hale] |
8488 | A concept is a function whose value is always a truth-value [Frege] |
9948 | Unlike objects, concepts are inherently incomplete [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
23481 | Propositions assemble a world experimentally, like the model of a road accident [Wittgenstein] |
4972 | I may regard a thought about Phosphorus as true, and the same thought about Hesperus as false [Frege] |
8870 | Content of thought is established through communication, so knowledge needs other minds [Davidson] |
8869 | The principle of charity attributes largely consistent logic and largely true beliefs to speakers [Davidson] |
4678 | Absolute prohibitions are the essence of ethics, and suicide is the most obvious example [Wittgenstein] |
8491 | The Ontological Argument fallaciously treats existence as a first-level concept [Frege] |