9 ideas
15545 | Armstrong's analysis seeks truthmakers rather than definitions [Lewis] |
15546 | Predications aren't true because of what exists, but of how it exists [Lewis] |
15548 | Say 'truth is supervenient on being', but construe 'being' broadly [Lewis] |
14399 | Presentism says only the present exists, so there is nothing for tensed truths to supervene on [Lewis] |
9226 | If mathematical theories conflict, it may just be that they have different subject matter [Field,H] |
15543 | How do things combine to make states of affairs? Constituents can repeat, and fail to combine [Lewis] |
3597 | Foundations need not precede other beliefs [Wittgenstein] |
3596 | Total doubt can't even get started [Wittgenstein, by Williams,M] |
4721 | If you are not certain of any fact, you cannot be certain of the meaning of your words either [Wittgenstein] |