30 ideas
18274 | Analysis complicates a statement, but only as far as the complexity of its meaning [Wittgenstein] |
16539 | A definition of a circle will show what it is, and show its generating principle [Lowe] |
16540 | Defining an ellipse by conic sections reveals necessities, but not the essence of an ellipse [Lowe] |
16548 | An essence is what an entity is, revealed by a real definition; this is not an entity in its own right [Lowe] |
16549 | Simple things like 'red' can be given real ostensive definitions [Lowe] |
16908 | We can dispense with self-evidence, if language itself prevents logical mistakes [Jeshion on Wittgenstein] |
18276 | A statement's logical form derives entirely from its constituents [Wittgenstein] |
6563 | 'And' and 'not' are non-referring terms, which do not represent anything [Wittgenstein, by Fogelin] |
23472 | The sense of propositions relies on the world's basic logical structure [Wittgenstein] |
16545 | The essence of lumps and statues shows that two objects coincide but are numerically distinct [Lowe] |
16546 | The essence of a bronze statue shows that it could be made of different bronze [Lowe] |
16551 | Grasping an essence is just grasping a real definition [Lowe] |
16542 | Explanation can't give an account of essence, because it is too multi-faceted [Lowe] |
16552 | If we must know some entity to know an essence, we lack a faculty to do that [Lowe] |
16533 | Logical necessities, based on laws of logic, are a proper sub-class of metaphysical necessities [Lowe] |
16531 | 'Metaphysical' necessity is absolute and objective - the strongest kind of necessity [Lowe] |
16532 | 'Epistemic' necessity is better called 'certainty' [Lowe] |
16543 | If an essence implies p, then p is an essential truth, and hence metaphysically necessary [Lowe] |
16544 | Metaphysical necessity is either an essential truth, or rests on essential truths [Lowe] |
16538 | We could give up possible worlds if we based necessity on essences [Lowe] |
23500 | My main problem is the order of the world, and whether it is knowable a priori [Wittgenstein] |
16534 | 'Intuitions' are just unreliable 'hunches'; over centuries intuitions change enormously [Lowe] |
8840 | There are five possible responses to the problem of infinite regress in justification [Cleve] |
8841 | Modern foundationalists say basic beliefs are fallible, and coherence is relevant [Cleve] |
22323 | The philosophical I is the metaphysical subject, the limit - not a part of the world [Wittgenstein] |
16535 | A concept is a way of thinking of things or kinds, whether or not they exist [Lowe] |
23481 | Propositions assemble a world experimentally, like the model of a road accident [Wittgenstein] |
16550 | Direct reference doesn't seem to require that thinkers know what it is they are thinking about [Lowe] |
4678 | Absolute prohibitions are the essence of ethics, and suicide is the most obvious example [Wittgenstein] |
16547 | H2O isn't necessary, because different laws of nature might affect how O and H combine [Lowe] |