Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Notebooks 1914-1916', 'Jerry A. Fodor on himself' and 'A World of States of Affairs'

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21 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
18274 Analysis complicates a statement, but only as far as the complexity of its meaning [Wittgenstein]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
4742 Correspondence may be one-many or many one, as when either p or q make 'p or q' true [Armstrong]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
16908 We can dispense with self-evidence, if language itself prevents logical mistakes [Jeshion on Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
18276 A statement's logical form derives entirely from its constituents [Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
6563 'And' and 'not' are non-referring terms, which do not represent anything [Wittgenstein, by Fogelin]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / d. Logical atoms
23472 The sense of propositions relies on the world's basic logical structure [Wittgenstein]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 7. Fictionalism
9497 Without modality, Armstrong falls back on fictionalism to support counterfactual laws [Bird on Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
15550 Properties are contingently existing beings with multiple locations in space and time [Armstrong, by Lewis]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
4743 The truth-maker for a truth must necessitate that truth [Armstrong]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 5. A Priori Synthetic
23500 My main problem is the order of the world, and whether it is knowable a priori [Wittgenstein]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 2. Associationism
3978 Associations are held to connect Ideas together in the way the world is connected together [Fodor]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
3976 Intentional science needs objects with semantic and causal properties, and which obey laws [Fodor]
3980 Intentional states and processes may be causal relations among mental symbols [Fodor]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
22323 The philosophical I is the metaphysical subject, the limit - not a part of the world [Wittgenstein]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
3981 Most psychological properties seem to be multiply realisable [Fodor]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
3975 Folk psychology explains behaviour by reference to intentional states like belief and desire [Fodor]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
3982 How could the extrinsic properties of thoughts supervene on their intrinsic properties? [Fodor]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
23481 Propositions assemble a world experimentally, like the model of a road accident [Wittgenstein]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 4. Suicide
4678 Absolute prohibitions are the essence of ethics, and suicide is the most obvious example [Wittgenstein]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
4798 In recent writings, Armstrong makes a direct identification of necessitation with causation [Armstrong, by Psillos]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 9. Counterfactual Claims
3977 Laws are true generalisations which support counterfactuals and are confirmed by instances [Fodor]