Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Notebooks 1914-1916', 'Jerry A. Fodor on himself' and 'Mathematics without Numbers'

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19 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
Analysis complicates a statement, but only as far as the complexity of its meaning [Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
We can dispense with self-evidence, if language itself prevents logical mistakes [Jeshion on Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
A statement's logical form derives entirely from its constituents [Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
'And' and 'not' are non-referring terms, which do not represent anything [Wittgenstein, by Fogelin]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / c. Nominalist structuralism
Modal structuralism says mathematics studies possible structures, which may or may not be actualised [Hellman, by Friend]
Statements of pure mathematics are elliptical for a sort of modal conditional [Hellman, by Chihara]
Modal structuralism can only judge possibility by 'possible' models [Shapiro on Hellman]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / d. Logical atoms
The sense of propositions relies on the world's basic logical structure [Wittgenstein]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 5. A Priori Synthetic
My main problem is the order of the world, and whether it is knowable a priori [Wittgenstein]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 2. Associationism
Associations are held to connect Ideas together in the way the world is connected together [Fodor]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
Intentional science needs objects with semantic and causal properties, and which obey laws [Fodor]
Intentional states and processes may be causal relations among mental symbols [Fodor]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
The philosophical I is the metaphysical subject, the limit - not a part of the world [Wittgenstein]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
Most psychological properties seem to be multiply realisable [Fodor]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
Folk psychology explains behaviour by reference to intentional states like belief and desire [Fodor]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
How could the extrinsic properties of thoughts supervene on their intrinsic properties? [Fodor]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
Propositions assemble a world experimentally, like the model of a road accident [Wittgenstein]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 4. Suicide
Absolute prohibitions are the essence of ethics, and suicide is the most obvious example [Wittgenstein]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 9. Counterfactual Claims
Laws are true generalisations which support counterfactuals and are confirmed by instances [Fodor]