89 ideas
18730 | The history of philosophy only matters if the subject is a choice between rival theories [Wittgenstein] |
21970 | Philosophy attains its goal if one person feels perfect accord between their system and experience [Fichte] |
19073 | True philosophy aims at absolute unity, while our understanding sees only separation [Hegel] |
18704 | Philosophy tries to be rid of certain intellectual puzzles, irrelevant to daily life [Wittgenstein] |
15624 | Free thinking has no presuppositions [Hegel] |
18710 | Philosophers express puzzlement, but don't clearly state the puzzle [Wittgenstein] |
15631 | The ideal of reason is the unification of abstract identity (or 'concept') and being [Hegel] |
15612 | Older metaphysics naively assumed that thought grasped things in themselves [Hegel] |
21768 | Logic is metaphysics, the science of things grasped in thoughts [Hegel] |
18732 | We don't need a theory of truth, because we use the word perfectly well [Wittgenstein] |
18714 | We already know what we want to know, and analysis gives us no new facts [Wittgenstein] |
21984 | We must break up the rigidity that our understanding has imposed [Hegel] |
22081 | Let thought follow its own course, and don't interfere [Hegel] |
15626 | Categories create objective experience, but are too conditioned by things to actually grasp them [Hegel] |
6912 | For Fichte there is no God outside the ego, and 'our religion is reason' [Fichte, by Feuerbach] |
15616 | If truth is just non-contradiction, we must take care that our basic concepts aren't contradictory [Hegel] |
21767 | Dialectic is seen in popular proverbs like 'pride comes before a fall' [Hegel] |
15638 | Dialectic is the moving soul of scientific progression, the principle which binds science together [Hegel] |
15639 | Socratic dialectic is subjective, but Plato made it freely scientific and objective [Hegel] |
15615 | Older metaphysics became dogmatic, by assuming opposed assertions must be true and false [Hegel] |
18706 | Words of the same kind can be substituted in a proposition without producing nonsense [Wittgenstein] |
18735 | Talking nonsense is not following the rules [Wittgenstein] |
18719 | Grammar says that saying 'sound is red' is not false, but nonsense [Wittgenstein] |
19070 | Superficial truth is knowing how something is, which is consciousness of bare correctness [Hegel] |
18731 | There is no theory of truth, because it isn't a concept [Wittgenstein] |
5644 | In Hegel's logic it is concepts (rather than judgements or propositions) which are true or false [Hegel, by Scruton] |
19072 | In the deeper sense of truth, to be untrue resembles being bad; badness is untrue to a thing's nature [Hegel] |
19071 | The deeper sense of truth is a thing matching the idea of what it ought to be [Hegel] |
18707 | All thought has the logical form of reality [Wittgenstein] |
18724 | In logic nothing is hidden [Wittgenstein] |
18709 | Laws of logic are like laws of chess - if you change them, it's just a different game [Wittgenstein] |
21595 | Excluded middle is the maxim of definite understanding, but just produces contradictions [Hegel] |
18736 | Contradiction is between two rules, not between rule and reality [Wittgenstein] |
18723 | We may correctly use 'not' without making the rule explicit [Wittgenstein] |
18718 | Saying 'and' has meaning is just saying it works in a sentence [Wittgenstein] |
18727 | A person's name doesn't mean their body; bodies don't sit down, and their existence can be denied [Wittgenstein] |
15628 | The idea that contradiction is essential to rational understanding is a key modern idea [Hegel] |
15629 | Tenderness for the world solves the antinomies; contradiction is in our reason, not in the essence of the world [Hegel] |
15630 | Antinomies are not just in four objects, but in all objects, all representations, all objects and all ideas [Hegel] |
18738 | We don't get 'nearer' to something by adding decimals to 1.1412... (root-2) [Wittgenstein] |
18708 | Infinity is not a number, so doesn't say how many; it is the property of a law [Wittgenstein] |
18737 | There are no positive or negative facts; these are just the forms of propositions [Wittgenstein] |
15634 | Thought about particulars is done entirely through categories [Hegel] |
22078 | Even simple propositions about sensations are filled with categories [Hegel] |
18715 | Using 'green' is a commitment to future usage of 'green' [Wittgenstein] |
21981 | The one substance is formless without the mediation of dialectical concepts [Hegel] |
15637 | Essence is the essential self-positing unity of immediacy and mediation [Hegel] |
15613 | Real cognition grasps a thing from within itself, and is not satisfied with mere predicates [Hegel] |
18726 | For each necessity in the world there is an arbitrary rule of language [Wittgenstein] |
18712 | Understanding is translation, into action or into other symbols [Wittgenstein] |
15636 | The Cogito is at the very centre of the entire concern of modern philosophy [Hegel] |
21973 | Fichte believed in things-in-themselves [Fichte, by Moore,AW] |
21914 | We can deduce experience from self-consciousness, without the thing-in-itself [Fichte] |
20951 | The absolute I divides into consciousness, and a world which is not-I [Fichte, by Bowie] |
21964 | Reason arises from freedom, so philosophy starts from the self, and not from the laws of nature [Fichte] |
21968 | Abandon the thing-in-itself; things only exist in relation to our thinking [Fichte] |
22300 | Existence is just a set of relationships [Hegel] |
15609 | The sensible is distinguished from thought by being about singular things [Hegel] |
18280 | We live in sense-data, but talk about physical objects [Wittgenstein] |
18729 | Part of what we mean by stating the facts is the way we tend to experience them [Wittgenstein] |
15625 | Sense perception is secondary and dependent, while thought is independent and primitive [Hegel] |
15620 | Empiricism contains the important idea that we should see knowledge for ourselves, and be part of it [Hegel] |
15619 | Empiricism made particular knowledge possible, and blocked wild claims [Hegel] |
15622 | Empiricism unknowingly contains and uses a metaphysic, which underlies its categories [Hegel] |
15621 | Empiricism of the finite denies the supersensible, and can only think with formal abstraction [Hegel] |
15632 | The Humean view stops us thinking about perception, and finding universals and necessities in it [Hegel] |
18734 | If you remember wrongly, then there must be some other criterion than your remembering [Wittgenstein] |
15623 | Humean scepticism, unlike ancient Greek scepticism, accepts the truth of experience as basic [Hegel] |
18721 | Explanation and understanding are the same [Wittgenstein] |
18720 | Explanation gives understanding by revealing the full multiplicity of the thing [Wittgenstein] |
18716 | A machine strikes us as being a rule of movement [Wittgenstein] |
18713 | If an explanation is good, the symbol is used properly in the future [Wittgenstein] |
21965 | Spinoza could not actually believe his determinism, because living requires free will [Fichte] |
15617 | In abstraction, beyond finitude, freedom and necessity must exist together [Hegel] |
18717 | Thought is an activity which we perform by the expression of it [Wittgenstein] |
15608 | The act of thinking is the bringing forth of universals [Hegel] |
21986 | Hegel's system has a vast number of basic concepts [Hegel, by Moore,AW] |
15607 | We don't think with concepts - we think the concepts [Hegel] |
15610 | Active thought about objects produces the universal, which is what is true and essential of it [Hegel] |
18725 | A proposition draws a line around the facts which agree with it [Wittgenstein] |
18728 | The meaning of a proposition is the mode of its verification [Wittgenstein] |
18705 | Words function only in propositions, like levers in a machine [Wittgenstein] |
18711 | A proposition is any expression which can be significantly negated [Wittgenstein] |
15614 | Old metaphysics tried to grasp eternal truths through causal events, which is impossible [Hegel] |
18733 | Laws of nature are an aspect of the phenomena, and are just our mode of description [Wittgenstein] |
15635 | The older conception of God was emptied of human features, to make it worthy of the Infinite [Hegel] |
21980 | God is the absolute thing, and also the absolute person [Hegel] |
15618 | If God is the abstract of Supremely Real Essence, then God is a mere Beyond, and unknowable [Hegel] |
15633 | We establish unification of the Ideal by the ontological proof, deriving being from abstraction of thinking [Hegel] |