Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Notebooks 1914-1916', 'works' and 'Essential Attribution'

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21 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
Analysis complicates a statement, but only as far as the complexity of its meaning [Wittgenstein]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
Von Neumann defines each number as the set of all smaller numbers [Neumann, by Blackburn]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
Von Neumann wanted mathematical functions to replace sets [Neumann, by Benardete,JA]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
We can dispense with self-evidence, if language itself prevents logical mistakes [Jeshion on Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
A statement's logical form derives entirely from its constituents [Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
'And' and 'not' are non-referring terms, which do not represent anything [Wittgenstein, by Fogelin]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / e. Ordinal numbers
Von Neumann defined ordinals as the set of all smaller ordinals [Neumann, by Poundstone]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / d. Logical atoms
The sense of propositions relies on the world's basic logical structure [Wittgenstein]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
Aristotelian essentialism involves a 'natural' or 'causal' interpretation of modal operators [Marcus (Barcan)]
Aristotelian essentialism is about shared properties, individuating essentialism about distinctive properties [Marcus (Barcan)]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
Essentialist sentences are not theorems of modal logic, and can even be false [Marcus (Barcan)]
'Essentially' won't replace 'necessarily' for vacuous properties like snub-nosed or self-identical [Marcus (Barcan)]
'Is essentially' has a different meaning from 'is necessarily', as they often cannot be substituted [Marcus (Barcan)]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences
If essences are objects with only essential properties, they are elusive in possible worlds [Marcus (Barcan)]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
The use of possible worlds is to sort properties (not to individuate objects) [Marcus (Barcan)]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
In possible worlds, names are just neutral unvarying pegs for truths and predicates [Marcus (Barcan)]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 5. A Priori Synthetic
My main problem is the order of the world, and whether it is knowable a priori [Wittgenstein]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
The philosophical I is the metaphysical subject, the limit - not a part of the world [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
Propositions assemble a world experimentally, like the model of a road accident [Wittgenstein]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 4. Suicide
Absolute prohibitions are the essence of ethics, and suicide is the most obvious example [Wittgenstein]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
Dispositional essences are special, as if an object loses them they cease to exist [Marcus (Barcan)]