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All the ideas for 'Lectures 1930-32 (student notes)', 'Creating Capabilities' and 'Understanding'

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57 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 1. History of Philosophy
The history of philosophy only matters if the subject is a choice between rival theories [Wittgenstein]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / d. Philosophy as puzzles
Philosophy tries to be rid of certain intellectual puzzles, irrelevant to daily life [Wittgenstein]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
Philosophers express puzzlement, but don't clearly state the puzzle [Wittgenstein]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
We don't need a theory of truth, because we use the word perfectly well [Wittgenstein]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
We already know what we want to know, and analysis gives us no new facts [Wittgenstein]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
Keep premises as weak as possible, to avoid controversial difficulties [Nussbaum]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 8. Category Mistake / a. Category mistakes
Words of the same kind can be substituted in a proposition without producing nonsense [Wittgenstein]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 8. Category Mistake / b. Category mistake as syntactic
Talking nonsense is not following the rules [Wittgenstein]
Grammar says that saying 'sound is red' is not false, but nonsense [Wittgenstein]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
There is no theory of truth, because it isn't a concept [Wittgenstein]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
All thought has the logical form of reality [Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
In logic nothing is hidden [Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 4. Logic by Convention
Laws of logic are like laws of chess - if you change them, it's just a different game [Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 3. Contradiction
Contradiction is between two rules, not between rule and reality [Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / c. not
We may correctly use 'not' without making the rule explicit [Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / d. and
Saying 'and' has meaning is just saying it works in a sentence [Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
A person's name doesn't mean their body; bodies don't sit down, and their existence can be denied [Wittgenstein]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
We don't get 'nearer' to something by adding decimals to 1.1412... (root-2) [Wittgenstein]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / a. The Infinite
Infinity is not a number, so doesn't say how many; it is the property of a law [Wittgenstein]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact
There are no positive or negative facts; these are just the forms of propositions [Wittgenstein]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 5. Universals as Concepts
Using 'green' is a commitment to future usage of 'green' [Wittgenstein]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 3. Necessity by Convention
For each necessity in the world there is an arbitrary rule of language [Wittgenstein]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
Understanding is translation, into action or into other symbols [Wittgenstein]
Unlike knowledge, you can achieve understanding through luck [Grimm]
'Grasping' a structure seems to be modal, because we must anticipate its behaviour [Grimm]
You may have 'weak' understanding, if by luck you can answer a set of 'why questions' [Grimm]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
We live in sense-data, but talk about physical objects [Wittgenstein]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems
Part of what we mean by stating the facts is the way we tend to experience them [Wittgenstein]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
If you remember wrongly, then there must be some other criterion than your remembering [Wittgenstein]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
Explanation and understanding are the same [Wittgenstein]
Explanation gives understanding by revealing the full multiplicity of the thing [Wittgenstein]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
A machine strikes us as being a rule of movement [Wittgenstein]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / a. Best explanation
If an explanation is good, the symbol is used properly in the future [Wittgenstein]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
Thought is an activity which we perform by the expression of it [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
A proposition draws a line around the facts which agree with it [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
The meaning of a proposition is the mode of its verification [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / a. Sentence meaning
Words function only in propositions, like levers in a machine [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
A proposition is any expression which can be significantly negated [Wittgenstein]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 8. The Arts / b. Literature
Storytelling is never neutral; some features of the world must be emphasised [Nussbaum]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / c. Particularism
Particularism gives no guidance for the future [Nussbaum]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / f. Compassion
Compassion is unreliable, because it favours people close to us [Nussbaum]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / c. Social contract
Social contracts assume equal powers among the participants [Nussbaum]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 4. Social Utilitarianism
We shouldn't focus on actual preferences, which may be distorted by injustices [Nussbaum]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / a. Liberalism basics
Liberalism does not need a comprehensive account of value [Nussbaum]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 12. Feminism
Women are often treated like children, and not respected for their choices [Nussbaum]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
Negative liberty is incoherent; all liberties, to do and to be, require the prevention of interference [Nussbaum]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 6. Political freedom
Political freedom is an incoherent project, because some freedoms limit other freedoms [Nussbaum]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
Political and civil rights are not separate from economic and social rights [Nussbaum]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 1. Basis of justice
Capabilities: Life, Health, Safety, Mental life, Love, Planning, Joining in, Nature, Play, Control [Nussbaum, by PG]
Justice requires that the ten main capabilities of people are reasonably enabled [Nussbaum]
Capabilities are grounded in bare humanity and agency; qualifying as rational is not needed [Nussbaum]
Rights are not just barriers against state interference; governments must affirm capabilities of citizens [Nussbaum]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 2. Religion in Society
Any establishment belief system is incompatible with full respect for all citizens [Nussbaum]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
We should respect animals in the way that we respect the animal nature in humans [Nussbaum]
It may be no harm to kill an animal which cannot plan for its future [Nussbaum]
The Capabilities Approach sees animals as agents, not just as having feelings [Nussbaum]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature
Laws of nature are an aspect of the phenomena, and are just our mode of description [Wittgenstein]