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All the ideas for 'Letter to Russell', 'Intensional Logic' and 'Letters to Jourdain'

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14 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
The main problem of philosophy is what can and cannot be thought and expressed [Wittgenstein, by Grayling]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 8. Intensional Logic
If terms change their designations in different states, they are functions from states to objects [Fitting]
Intensional logic adds a second type of quantification, over intensional objects, or individual concepts [Fitting]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 9. Awareness Logic
Awareness logic adds the restriction of an awareness function to epistemic logic [Fitting]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 10. Justification Logics
Justication logics make explicit the reasons for mathematical truth in proofs [Fitting]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 8. Logic of Mathematics
Classical logic is deliberately extensional, in order to model mathematics [Fitting]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
In 'Etna is higher than Vesuvius' the whole of Etna, including all the lava, can't be the reference [Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
Any object can have many different names, each with a distinct sense [Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 3. Property (λ-) Abstraction
λ-abstraction disambiguates the scope of modal operators [Fitting]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / d. Logical atoms
Atomic facts correspond to true elementary propositions [Wittgenstein]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
Definite descriptions pick out different objects in different possible worlds [Fitting]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / a. Sentence meaning
We understand new propositions by constructing their sense from the words [Frege]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / a. Sense and reference
Senses can't be subjective, because propositions would be private, and disagreement impossible [Frege]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
A thought is mental constituents that relate to reality as words do [Wittgenstein]