Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Notebooks 1914-1916', 'Epistemic Injustice' and 'Belief Truth and Knowledge'

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19 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
18274 Analysis complicates a statement, but only as far as the complexity of its meaning [Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
16908 We can dispense with self-evidence, if language itself prevents logical mistakes [Jeshion on Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
18276 A statement's logical form derives entirely from its constituents [Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
6563 'And' and 'not' are non-referring terms, which do not represent anything [Wittgenstein, by Fogelin]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / d. Logical atoms
23472 The sense of propositions relies on the world's basic logical structure [Wittgenstein]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
23551 It is necessary for a belief that it be held for a length of time [Fricker,M]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 5. A Priori Synthetic
23500 My main problem is the order of the world, and whether it is knowable a priori [Wittgenstein]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 7. Causal Perception
3900 Maybe experience is not essential to perception, but only to the causing of beliefs [Armstrong, by Scruton]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 1. Epistemic virtues
23558 Offering knowledge needs accuracy and sincerity; receiving it needs testimonial justice [Fricker,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
4253 Externalism says knowledge involves a natural relation between the belief state and what makes it true [Armstrong]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 7. Testimony
23550 Burge says we are normally a priori entitled to believe testimony [Fricker,M]
23552 We assess testimonial probabilities by the speaker, the listener, the facts, and the circumstances [Fricker,M]
23553 Testimonial judgement is not logical, but produces reasons and motivations [Fricker,M]
23555 Assessing credibility involves the impact of both the speaker's and the listener's social identity [Fricker,M]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
22323 The philosophical I is the metaphysical subject, the limit - not a part of the world [Wittgenstein]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / a. Nature of Judgement
23554 Judgements can be unreflective and non-inferential, yet rational, by being sensitive to experience [Fricker,M]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
23481 Propositions assemble a world experimentally, like the model of a road accident [Wittgenstein]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
23557 To judge agents in remote times and cultures we need a moral resentment weaker than blame [Fricker,M]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 4. Suicide
4678 Absolute prohibitions are the essence of ethics, and suicide is the most obvious example [Wittgenstein]