11 ideas
17884 | Mathematical set theory has many plausible stopping points, such as finitism, and predicativism [Koellner] |
17893 | 'Reflection principles' say the whole truth about sets can't be captured [Koellner] |
17894 | We have no argument to show a statement is absolutely undecidable [Koellner] |
17890 | There are at least eleven types of large cardinal, of increasing logical strength [Koellner] |
17887 | PA is consistent as far as we can accept, and we expand axioms to overcome limitations [Koellner] |
17891 | Arithmetical undecidability is always settled at the next stage up [Koellner] |
19679 | 'Access' internalism says responsibility needs access; weaker 'mentalism' needs mental justification [Kvanvig] |
3597 | Foundations need not precede other beliefs [Wittgenstein] |
19678 | Strong foundationalism needs strict inferences; weak version has induction, explanation, probability [Kvanvig] |
3596 | Total doubt can't even get started [Wittgenstein, by Williams,M] |
4721 | If you are not certain of any fact, you cannot be certain of the meaning of your words either [Wittgenstein] |