Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Notebooks 1914-1916', 'Moral Realism and Moral Dilemma' and 'Lewis: reduction of mind (on himself)'

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22 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
Analysis complicates a statement, but only as far as the complexity of its meaning [Wittgenstein]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 1. Argument
Arguments are nearly always open to challenge, but they help to explain a position rather than force people to believe [Lewis]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
We can dispense with self-evidence, if language itself prevents logical mistakes [Jeshion on Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
A statement's logical form derives entirely from its constituents [Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
'And' and 'not' are non-referring terms, which do not represent anything [Wittgenstein, by Fogelin]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
The whole truth supervenes on the physical truth [Lewis]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / b. Types of supervenience
Where pixels make up a picture, supervenience is reduction [Lewis]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / d. Logical atoms
The sense of propositions relies on the world's basic logical structure [Wittgenstein]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 5. A Priori Synthetic
My main problem is the order of the world, and whether it is knowable a priori [Wittgenstein]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / b. Purpose of mind
A mind is an organ of representation [Lewis]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
The philosophical I is the metaphysical subject, the limit - not a part of the world [Wittgenstein]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
Human pain might be one thing; Martian pain might be something else [Lewis]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
I am a reductionist about mind because I am an a priori reductionist about everything [Lewis]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
Folk psychology makes good predictions, by associating mental states with causal roles [Lewis]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
Folk psychology doesn't say that there is a language of thought [Lewis]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
If you don't share an external world with a brain-in-a-vat, then externalism says you don't share any beliefs [Lewis]
Nothing shows that all content is 'wide', or that wide content has logical priority [Lewis]
A spontaneous duplicate of you would have your brain states but no experience, so externalism would deny him any beliefs [Lewis]
Wide content derives from narrow content and relationships with external things [Lewis]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
Propositions assemble a world experimentally, like the model of a road accident [Wittgenstein]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / j. Unity of virtue
Maybe virtues conflict with each other, if some virtue needs a vice for its achievement [Foot]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 4. Suicide
Absolute prohibitions are the essence of ethics, and suicide is the most obvious example [Wittgenstein]