62 ideas
18730 | The history of philosophy only matters if the subject is a choice between rival theories [Wittgenstein] |
18704 | Philosophy tries to be rid of certain intellectual puzzles, irrelevant to daily life [Wittgenstein] |
18710 | Philosophers express puzzlement, but don't clearly state the puzzle [Wittgenstein] |
11159 | My account shows how the concept works, rather than giving an analysis [Fine,K] |
18732 | We don't need a theory of truth, because we use the word perfectly well [Wittgenstein] |
18714 | We already know what we want to know, and analysis gives us no new facts [Wittgenstein] |
11157 | Modern philosophy has largely abandoned real definitions, apart from sortals [Fine,K] |
11171 | Defining a term and giving the essence of an object don't just resemble - they are the same [Fine,K] |
18706 | Words of the same kind can be substituted in a proposition without producing nonsense [Wittgenstein] |
18735 | Talking nonsense is not following the rules [Wittgenstein] |
18719 | Grammar says that saying 'sound is red' is not false, but nonsense [Wittgenstein] |
18731 | There is no theory of truth, because it isn't a concept [Wittgenstein] |
18707 | All thought has the logical form of reality [Wittgenstein] |
18724 | In logic nothing is hidden [Wittgenstein] |
18709 | Laws of logic are like laws of chess - if you change them, it's just a different game [Wittgenstein] |
18736 | Contradiction is between two rules, not between rule and reality [Wittgenstein] |
18723 | We may correctly use 'not' without making the rule explicit [Wittgenstein] |
18718 | Saying 'and' has meaning is just saying it works in a sentence [Wittgenstein] |
18727 | A person's name doesn't mean their body; bodies don't sit down, and their existence can be denied [Wittgenstein] |
18738 | We don't get 'nearer' to something by adding decimals to 1.1412... (root-2) [Wittgenstein] |
18708 | Infinity is not a number, so doesn't say how many; it is the property of a law [Wittgenstein] |
11151 | An object is dependent if its essence prevents it from existing without some other object [Fine,K] |
18737 | There are no positive or negative facts; these are just the forms of propositions [Wittgenstein] |
18715 | Using 'green' is a commitment to future usage of 'green' [Wittgenstein] |
304 | Beautiful things must be different from beauty itself, but beauty itself must be present in each of them [Plato] |
11152 | Essences are either taken as real definitions, or as necessary properties [Fine,K] |
11161 | Essentially having a property is naturally expressed as 'the property it must have to be what it is' [Fine,K] |
11160 | Simple modal essentialism refers to necessary properties of an object [Fine,K] |
11158 | Essentialist claims can be formulated more clearly with quantified modal logic [Fine,K] |
11167 | Metaphysical necessity is a special case of essence, not vice versa [Fine,K] |
16537 | Essence as necessary properties produces a profusion of essential properties [Fine,K, by Lowe] |
11163 | The nature of singleton Socrates has him as a member, but not vice versa [Fine,K] |
11164 | It is not part of the essence of Socrates that a huge array of necessary truths should hold [Fine,K] |
10935 | An essential property of something must be bound up with what it is to be that thing [Fine,K, by Rami] |
10936 | Essential properties are part of an object's 'definition' [Fine,K, by Rami] |
11165 | If Socrates lacks necessary existence, then his nature cannot require his parents' existence [Fine,K] |
11166 | The subject of a proposition need not be the source of its necessity [Fine,K] |
18726 | For each necessity in the world there is an arbitrary rule of language [Wittgenstein] |
11169 | Conceptual necessities rest on the nature of all concepts [Fine,K] |
11162 | Socrates is necessarily distinct from the Eiffel Tower, but that is not part of his essence [Fine,K] |
11168 | Metaphysical necessities are true in virtue of the nature of all objects [Fine,K] |
16120 | Knowing how to achieve immortality is pointless without the knowledge how to use immortality [Plato] |
18712 | Understanding is translation, into action or into other symbols [Wittgenstein] |
18280 | We live in sense-data, but talk about physical objects [Wittgenstein] |
18729 | Part of what we mean by stating the facts is the way we tend to experience them [Wittgenstein] |
18734 | If you remember wrongly, then there must be some other criterion than your remembering [Wittgenstein] |
303 | Say how many teeth the other has, then count them. If you are right, we will trust your other claims [Plato] |
18721 | Explanation and understanding are the same [Wittgenstein] |
18720 | Explanation gives understanding by revealing the full multiplicity of the thing [Wittgenstein] |
18716 | A machine strikes us as being a rule of movement [Wittgenstein] |
18713 | If an explanation is good, the symbol is used properly in the future [Wittgenstein] |
18717 | Thought is an activity which we perform by the expression of it [Wittgenstein] |
18725 | A proposition draws a line around the facts which agree with it [Wittgenstein] |
18728 | The meaning of a proposition is the mode of its verification [Wittgenstein] |
18705 | Words function only in propositions, like levers in a machine [Wittgenstein] |
18711 | A proposition is any expression which can be significantly negated [Wittgenstein] |
11170 | Analytic truth may only be true in virtue of the meanings of certain terms [Fine,K] |
11172 | The meaning of 'bachelor' is irrelevant to the meaning of 'unmarried man' [Fine,K] |
302 | What knowledge is required to live well? [Plato] |
301 | Only knowledge of some sort is good [Plato] |
305 | Something which lies midway between two evils is better than either of them [Plato] |
18733 | Laws of nature are an aspect of the phenomena, and are just our mode of description [Wittgenstein] |