35 ideas
18274 | Analysis complicates a statement, but only as far as the complexity of its meaning [Wittgenstein] |
18486 | We might define truth as arising from the truth-maker relation [MacBride] |
18484 | Phenomenalists, behaviourists and presentists can't supply credible truth-makers [MacBride] |
18466 | If truthmaking is classical entailment, then anything whatsoever makes a necessary truth [MacBride] |
18473 | 'Maximalism' says every truth has an actual truthmaker [MacBride] |
18481 | Maximalism follows Russell, and optimalism (no negative or universal truthmakers) follows Wittgenstein [MacBride] |
18483 | The main idea of truth-making is that what a proposition is about is what matters [MacBride] |
18479 | There are different types of truthmakers for different types of negative truth [MacBride] |
18477 | There aren't enough positive states out there to support all the negative truths [MacBride] |
18482 | Optimalists say that negative and universal are true 'by default' from the positive truths [MacBride] |
18474 | Does 'this sentence has no truth-maker' have a truth-maker? Reductio suggests it can't have [MacBride] |
18485 | Even idealists could accept truthmakers, as mind-dependent [MacBride] |
18490 | Maybe 'makes true' is not an active verb, but just a formal connective like 'because'? [MacBride] |
18493 | Truthmaker talk of 'something' making sentences true, which presupposes objectual quantification [MacBride] |
15717 | Using Choice, you can cut up a small ball and make an enormous one from the pieces [Kaplan/Kaplan] |
16908 | We can dispense with self-evidence, if language itself prevents logical mistakes [Jeshion on Wittgenstein] |
18276 | A statement's logical form derives entirely from its constituents [Wittgenstein] |
6563 | 'And' and 'not' are non-referring terms, which do not represent anything [Wittgenstein, by Fogelin] |
18489 | Connectives link sentences without linking their meanings [MacBride] |
18476 | 'A is F' may not be positive ('is dead'), and 'A is not-F' may not be negative ('is not blind') [MacBride] |
15712 | 1 and 0, then add for naturals, subtract for negatives, divide for rationals, take roots for irrationals [Kaplan/Kaplan] |
15711 | The rationals are everywhere - the irrationals are everywhere else [Kaplan/Kaplan] |
15714 | 'Commutative' laws say order makes no difference; 'associative' laws say groupings make no difference [Kaplan/Kaplan] |
15715 | 'Distributive' laws say if you add then multiply, or multiply then add, you get the same result [Kaplan/Kaplan] |
18480 | Maybe it only exists if it is a truthmaker (rather than the value of a variable)? [MacBride] |
18471 | Different types of 'grounding' seem to have no more than a family resemblance relation [MacBride] |
18472 | Which has priority - 'grounding' or 'truth-making'? [MacBride] |
23472 | The sense of propositions relies on the world's basic logical structure [Wittgenstein] |
18475 | Russell allows some complex facts, but Wittgenstein only allows atomic facts [MacBride] |
18478 | Wittgenstein's plan to show there is only logical necessity failed, because of colours [MacBride] |
23500 | My main problem is the order of the world, and whether it is knowable a priori [Wittgenstein] |
15713 | The first million numbers confirm that no number is greater than a million [Kaplan/Kaplan] |
22323 | The philosophical I is the metaphysical subject, the limit - not a part of the world [Wittgenstein] |
23481 | Propositions assemble a world experimentally, like the model of a road accident [Wittgenstein] |
4678 | Absolute prohibitions are the essence of ethics, and suicide is the most obvious example [Wittgenstein] |