63 ideas
| 18730 | The history of philosophy only matters if the subject is a choice between rival theories [Wittgenstein] |
| 18704 | Philosophy tries to be rid of certain intellectual puzzles, irrelevant to daily life [Wittgenstein] |
| 18710 | Philosophers express puzzlement, but don't clearly state the puzzle [Wittgenstein] |
| 18732 | We don't need a theory of truth, because we use the word perfectly well [Wittgenstein] |
| 18714 | We already know what we want to know, and analysis gives us no new facts [Wittgenstein] |
| 18706 | Words of the same kind can be substituted in a proposition without producing nonsense [Wittgenstein] |
| 18735 | Talking nonsense is not following the rules [Wittgenstein] |
| 18719 | Grammar says that saying 'sound is red' is not false, but nonsense [Wittgenstein] |
| 18731 | There is no theory of truth, because it isn't a concept [Wittgenstein] |
| 18707 | All thought has the logical form of reality [Wittgenstein] |
| 18724 | In logic nothing is hidden [Wittgenstein] |
| 15571 | The idea of an atemporal realm of validity is as implausible as medieval theology [Heidegger] |
| 18709 | Laws of logic are like laws of chess - if you change them, it's just a different game [Wittgenstein] |
| 18736 | Contradiction is between two rules, not between rule and reality [Wittgenstein] |
| 18723 | We may correctly use 'not' without making the rule explicit [Wittgenstein] |
| 18718 | Saying 'and' has meaning is just saying it works in a sentence [Wittgenstein] |
| 18727 | A person's name doesn't mean their body; bodies don't sit down, and their existence can be denied [Wittgenstein] |
| 18738 | We don't get 'nearer' to something by adding decimals to 1.1412... (root-2) [Wittgenstein] |
| 18708 | Infinity is not a number, so doesn't say how many; it is the property of a law [Wittgenstein] |
| 18737 | There are no positive or negative facts; these are just the forms of propositions [Wittgenstein] |
| 18715 | Using 'green' is a commitment to future usage of 'green' [Wittgenstein] |
| 2730 | Because 'gold is malleable' is necessary does not mean that it is analytic [Audi,R] |
| 18726 | For each necessity in the world there is an arbitrary rule of language [Wittgenstein] |
| 18712 | Understanding is translation, into action or into other symbols [Wittgenstein] |
| 2715 | Beliefs are based on perception, memory, introspection or reason [Audi,R] |
| 2735 | Could you have a single belief on its own? [Audi,R] |
| 2736 | We can make certain of what we know, so knowing does not entail certainty [Audi,R] |
| 2722 | Sense-data theory is indirect realism, but phenomenalism is direct irrealism [Audi,R] |
| 2721 | If you gradually remove a book's sensory properties, what is left at the end? [Audi,R] |
| 2727 | Red and green being exclusive colours seems to be rationally graspable but not analytic [Audi,R] |
| 2728 | The concepts needed for a priori thought may come from experience [Audi,R] |
| 2716 | To see something as a field, I obviously need the concept of a field [Audi,R] |
| 2717 | How could I see a field and believe nothing regarding it? [Audi,R] |
| 18280 | We live in sense-data, but talk about physical objects [Wittgenstein] |
| 2720 | Sense-data (and the rival 'adverbial' theory) are to explain illusions and hallucinations [Audi,R] |
| 2719 | Sense data imply representative realism, possibly only representing primary qualities [Audi,R] |
| 18729 | Part of what we mean by stating the facts is the way we tend to experience them [Wittgenstein] |
| 2718 | Perception is first simple, then objectual (with concepts) and then propositional [Audi,R] |
| 2729 | Virtually all rationalists assert that we can have knowledge of synthetic a priori truths [Audi,R] |
| 2741 | The principles of justification have to be a priori [Audi,R] |
| 18734 | If you remember wrongly, then there must be some other criterion than your remembering [Wittgenstein] |
| 2725 | To remember something is to know it [Audi,R] |
| 2724 | I might remember someone I can't recall or image, by recognising them on meeting [Audi,R] |
| 2731 | Justification is either unanchored (infinite or circular), or anchored (in knowledge or non-knowledge) [Audi,R] |
| 2739 | Internalism about justification implies that there is a right to believe something [Audi,R] |
| 2732 | Maths may be consistent with observations, but not coherent [Audi,R] |
| 2733 | It is very hard to show how much coherence is needed for justification [Audi,R] |
| 2734 | A consistent madman could have a very coherent belief system [Audi,R] |
| 2738 | Consistent accurate prediction looks like knowledge without justified belief [Audi,R] |
| 2740 | A reliability theory of knowledge seems to involve truth as correspondence [Audi,R] |
| 2737 | 'Reliable' is a very imprecise term, and may even mean 'justified' [Audi,R] |
| 18721 | Explanation and understanding are the same [Wittgenstein] |
| 18720 | Explanation gives understanding by revealing the full multiplicity of the thing [Wittgenstein] |
| 18716 | A machine strikes us as being a rule of movement [Wittgenstein] |
| 18713 | If an explanation is good, the symbol is used properly in the future [Wittgenstein] |
| 2726 | We can be ignorant about ourselves, for example, our desires and motives [Audi,R] |
| 18717 | Thought is an activity which we perform by the expression of it [Wittgenstein] |
| 18725 | A proposition draws a line around the facts which agree with it [Wittgenstein] |
| 18728 | The meaning of a proposition is the mode of its verification [Wittgenstein] |
| 18705 | Words function only in propositions, like levers in a machine [Wittgenstein] |
| 18711 | A proposition is any expression which can be significantly negated [Wittgenstein] |
| 15581 | Dasein is always only that which it has chosen to be [Heidegger] |
| 18733 | Laws of nature are an aspect of the phenomena, and are just our mode of description [Wittgenstein] |