54 ideas
| 18730 | The history of philosophy only matters if the subject is a choice between rival theories [Wittgenstein] |
| 18704 | Philosophy tries to be rid of certain intellectual puzzles, irrelevant to daily life [Wittgenstein] |
| 18710 | Philosophers express puzzlement, but don't clearly state the puzzle [Wittgenstein] |
| 18732 | We don't need a theory of truth, because we use the word perfectly well [Wittgenstein] |
| 18714 | We already know what we want to know, and analysis gives us no new facts [Wittgenstein] |
| 9376 | A sentence may simultaneously define a term, and also assert a fact [Boghossian] |
| 18706 | Words of the same kind can be substituted in a proposition without producing nonsense [Wittgenstein] |
| 18735 | Talking nonsense is not following the rules [Wittgenstein] |
| 18719 | Grammar says that saying 'sound is red' is not false, but nonsense [Wittgenstein] |
| 18731 | There is no theory of truth, because it isn't a concept [Wittgenstein] |
| 18707 | All thought has the logical form of reality [Wittgenstein] |
| 18724 | In logic nothing is hidden [Wittgenstein] |
| 12766 | Logical space is abstracted from the actual world [Stalnaker] |
| 18709 | Laws of logic are like laws of chess - if you change them, it's just a different game [Wittgenstein] |
| 18736 | Contradiction is between two rules, not between rule and reality [Wittgenstein] |
| 18723 | We may correctly use 'not' without making the rule explicit [Wittgenstein] |
| 18718 | Saying 'and' has meaning is just saying it works in a sentence [Wittgenstein] |
| 18727 | A person's name doesn't mean their body; bodies don't sit down, and their existence can be denied [Wittgenstein] |
| 9375 | Conventionalism agrees with realists that logic has truth values, but not over the source [Boghossian] |
| 18738 | We don't get 'nearer' to something by adding decimals to 1.1412... (root-2) [Wittgenstein] |
| 18708 | Infinity is not a number, so doesn't say how many; it is the property of a law [Wittgenstein] |
| 18737 | There are no positive or negative facts; these are just the forms of propositions [Wittgenstein] |
| 18715 | Using 'green' is a commitment to future usage of 'green' [Wittgenstein] |
| 12764 | For the bare particular view, properties must be features, not just groups of objects [Stalnaker] |
| 12761 | An essential property is one had in all the possible worlds where a thing exists [Stalnaker] |
| 12763 | Necessarily self-identical, or being what it is, or its world-indexed properties, aren't essential [Stalnaker] |
| 12762 | Bare particular anti-essentialism makes no sense within modal logic semantics [Stalnaker] |
| 18726 | For each necessity in the world there is an arbitrary rule of language [Wittgenstein] |
| 12765 | Why imagine that Babe Ruth might be a billiard ball; nothing useful could be said about the ball [Stalnaker] |
| 18712 | Understanding is translation, into action or into other symbols [Wittgenstein] |
| 9369 | 'Snow is white or it isn't' is just true, not made true by stipulation [Boghossian] |
| 9367 | The a priori is explained as analytic to avoid a dubious faculty of intuition [Boghossian] |
| 9373 | That logic is a priori because it is analytic resulted from explaining the meaning of logical constants [Boghossian] |
| 9380 | We can't hold a sentence true without evidence if we can't agree which sentence is definitive of it [Boghossian] |
| 9384 | We may have strong a priori beliefs which we pragmatically drop from our best theory [Boghossian] |
| 18280 | We live in sense-data, but talk about physical objects [Wittgenstein] |
| 18729 | Part of what we mean by stating the facts is the way we tend to experience them [Wittgenstein] |
| 9374 | If we learn geometry by intuition, how could this faculty have misled us for so long? [Boghossian] |
| 18734 | If you remember wrongly, then there must be some other criterion than your remembering [Wittgenstein] |
| 18721 | Explanation and understanding are the same [Wittgenstein] |
| 18720 | Explanation gives understanding by revealing the full multiplicity of the thing [Wittgenstein] |
| 18716 | A machine strikes us as being a rule of movement [Wittgenstein] |
| 18713 | If an explanation is good, the symbol is used properly in the future [Wittgenstein] |
| 18717 | Thought is an activity which we perform by the expression of it [Wittgenstein] |
| 18725 | A proposition draws a line around the facts which agree with it [Wittgenstein] |
| 18728 | The meaning of a proposition is the mode of its verification [Wittgenstein] |
| 18705 | Words function only in propositions, like levers in a machine [Wittgenstein] |
| 9378 | If meaning depends on conceptual role, what properties are needed to do the job? [Boghossian] |
| 9377 | 'Conceptual role semantics' says terms have meaning from sentences and/or inferences [Boghossian] |
| 9372 | Could expressions have meaning, without two expressions possibly meaning the same? [Boghossian] |
| 18711 | A proposition is any expression which can be significantly negated [Wittgenstein] |
| 17721 | There are no truths in virtue of meaning, but there is knowability in virtue of understanding [Boghossian, by Jenkins] |
| 9368 | Epistemological analyticity: grasp of meaning is justification; metaphysical: truth depends on meaning [Boghossian] |
| 18733 | Laws of nature are an aspect of the phenomena, and are just our mode of description [Wittgenstein] |