37 ideas
6575 | Philosophy may never find foundations, and may undermine our lives in the process [Fogelin] |
6585 | Rationality is threatened by fear of inconsistency, illusions of absolutes or relativism, and doubt [Fogelin] |
6557 | Humans may never be able to attain a world view which is both rich and consistent [Fogelin] |
6568 | A game can be played, despite having inconsistent rules [Fogelin] |
6560 | The law of noncontradiction is traditionally the most basic principle of rationality [Fogelin] |
6565 | The law of noncontradiction makes the distinction between asserting something and denying it [Fogelin] |
6574 | Legal reasoning is analogical, not deductive [Fogelin] |
12463 | Unlike correspondence, truthmaking can be one truth to many truthmakers, or vice versa [Jacobs] |
11074 | 'It is true that this follows' means simply: this follows [Wittgenstein] |
11073 | Two and one making three has the necessity of logical inference [Wittgenstein] |
14375 | If structures result from intrinsic natures of properties, the 'relations' between them can drop out [Jacobs] |
14378 | Science aims at identifying the structure and nature of the powers that exist [Jacobs] |
12467 | Powers come from concrete particulars, not from the laws of nature [Jacobs] |
14377 | Possibilities are manifestations of some power, and impossibilies rest on no powers [Jacobs] |
14376 | States of affairs are only possible if some substance could initiate a causal chain to get there [Jacobs] |
14379 | Counterfactuals invite us to consider the powers picked out by the antecedent [Jacobs] |
14372 | Possible worlds are just not suitable truthmakers for modality [Jacobs] |
6582 | Conventions can only work if they are based on something non-conventional [Fogelin] |
12466 | All modality is in the properties and relations of the actual world [Jacobs] |
14371 | We can base counterfactuals on powers, not possible worlds, and hence define necessity [Jacobs] |
12465 | Concrete worlds, unlike fictions, at least offer evidence of how the actual world could be [Jacobs] |
12464 | If some book described a possibe life for you, that isn't what makes such a life possible [Jacobs] |
12469 | Possible worlds semantics gives little insight into modality [Jacobs] |
6576 | My view is 'circumspect rationalism' - that only our intellect can comprehend the world [Fogelin] |
6589 | Knowledge is legitimate only if all relevant defeaters have been eliminated [Fogelin] |
6596 | For coherentists, circularity is acceptable if the circle is large, rich and coherent [Fogelin] |
6597 | A rule of justification might be: don't raise the level of scrutiny without a good reason [Fogelin] |
6588 | Scepticism is cartesian (sceptical scenarios), or Humean (future), or Pyrrhonian (suspend belief) [Fogelin] |
6590 | Scepticism deals in remote possibilities that are ineliminable and set the standard very high [Fogelin] |
6583 | Radical perspectivism replaces Kant's necessary scheme with many different schemes [Fogelin] |
6555 | We are also irrational, with a unique ability to believe in bizarre self-created fictions [Fogelin] |
6605 | Critics must be causally entangled with their subject matter [Fogelin] |
6607 | The word 'beautiful', when deprived of context, is nearly contentless [Fogelin] |
6604 | Saying 'It's all a matter to taste' ignores the properties of the object discussed [Fogelin] |
6586 | Cynics are committed to morality, but disappointed or disgusted by human failings [Fogelin] |
6572 | Deterrence, prevention, rehabilitation and retribution can come into conflict in punishments [Fogelin] |
6573 | Retributivists say a crime can be 'paid for'; deterrentists still worry about potential victims [Fogelin] |