Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On Certainty', 'The Rationality of Science' and 'Fact, Fiction and Forecast (4th ed)'

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25 ideas

1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 1. Aims of Science
3859 We do not wish merely to predict, we also want to explain [Newton-Smith]
3870 The real problem of science is how to choose between possible explanations [Newton-Smith]
3853 For science to be rational, we must explain scientific change rationally [Newton-Smith]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 2. Positivism
3855 Critics attack positivist division between theory and observation [Newton-Smith]
3854 Positivists hold that theoretical terms change, but observation terms don't [Newton-Smith]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 6. Verisimilitude
3869 More truthful theories have greater predictive power [Newton-Smith]
3861 Theories generate infinite truths and falsehoods, so they cannot be used to assess probability [Newton-Smith]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 4. Logic by Convention
12394 If the result is bad, we change the rule; if we like the rule, we reject the result [Goodman]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
14292 Dispositions seem more ethereal than behaviour; a non-occult account of them would be nice [Goodman]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
3867 De re necessity arises from the way the world is [Newton-Smith]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
3872 We must assess the truth of beliefs in identifying them [Newton-Smith]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
3597 Foundations need not precede other beliefs [Wittgenstein]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
3596 Total doubt can't even get started [Wittgenstein, by Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique
3857 Defeat relativism by emphasising truth and reference, not meaning [Newton-Smith]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 1. Observation
3858 A full understanding of 'yellow' involves some theory [Newton-Smith]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 5. Anomalies
3862 All theories contain anomalies, and so are falsified! [Newton-Smith]
3863 The anomaly of Uranus didn't destroy Newton's mechanics - it led to Neptune's discovery [Newton-Smith]
3864 Anomalies are judged against rival theories, and support for the current theory [Newton-Smith]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
3865 Why should it matter whether or not a theory is scientific? [Newton-Smith]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 5. Commensurability
3866 If theories are really incommensurable, we could believe them all [Newton-Smith]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
18749 Goodman argued that the confirmation relation can never be formalised [Goodman, by Horsten/Pettigrew]
17646 Goodman showed that every sound inductive argument has an unsound one of the same form [Goodman, by Putnam]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 10. Denial of Meanings
4721 If you are not certain of any fact, you cannot be certain of the meaning of your words either [Wittgenstein]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
3871 Explaining an action is showing that it is rational [Newton-Smith]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 3. Laws and Generalities
4794 We don't use laws to make predictions, we call things laws if we make predictions with them [Goodman]