16 ideas
18274 | Analysis complicates a statement, but only as far as the complexity of its meaning [Wittgenstein] |
16908 | We can dispense with self-evidence, if language itself prevents logical mistakes [Jeshion on Wittgenstein] |
18276 | A statement's logical form derives entirely from its constituents [Wittgenstein] |
6563 | 'And' and 'not' are non-referring terms, which do not represent anything [Wittgenstein, by Fogelin] |
17505 | Using proper names properly doesn't involve necessary and sufficient conditions [Putnam] |
23472 | The sense of propositions relies on the world's basic logical structure [Wittgenstein] |
16654 | Our words and concepts don't always correspond to what is out there [William of Ockham] |
11908 | Putnam bases essences on 'same kind', but same kinds may not share properties [Mackie,P on Putnam] |
23500 | My main problem is the order of the world, and whether it is knowable a priori [Wittgenstein] |
17508 | Science aims at truth, not at 'simplicity' [Putnam] |
22323 | The philosophical I is the metaphysical subject, the limit - not a part of the world [Wittgenstein] |
23481 | Propositions assemble a world experimentally, like the model of a road accident [Wittgenstein] |
17506 | I now think reference by the tests of experts is a special case of being causally connected [Putnam] |
4678 | Absolute prohibitions are the essence of ethics, and suicide is the most obvious example [Wittgenstein] |
17507 | Natural kind stereotypes are 'strong' (obvious, like tiger) or 'weak' (obscure, like molybdenum) [Putnam] |
11904 | Express natural kinds as a posteriori predicate connections, not as singular terms [Putnam, by Mackie,P] |