31 ideas
| 1922 | Spiritual qualities only become advantageous with the growth of wisdom [Plato] |
| 18274 | Analysis complicates a statement, but only as far as the complexity of its meaning [Wittgenstein] |
| 10633 | 'Some critics admire only one another' cannot be paraphrased in singular first-order [Linnebo] |
| 16908 | We can dispense with self-evidence, if language itself prevents logical mistakes [Jeshion on Wittgenstein] |
| 10638 | A pure logic is wholly general, purely formal, and directly known [Linnebo] |
| 18276 | A statement's logical form derives entirely from its constituents [Wittgenstein] |
| 6563 | 'And' and 'not' are non-referring terms, which do not represent anything [Wittgenstein, by Fogelin] |
| 10640 | Instead of complex objects like tables, plurally quantify over mereological atoms tablewise [Linnebo] |
| 10636 | Plural plurals are unnatural and need a first-level ontology [Linnebo] |
| 10639 | Plural quantification may allow a monadic second-order theory with first-order ontology [Linnebo] |
| 10635 | Second-order quantification and plural quantification are different [Linnebo] |
| 10641 | Traditionally we eliminate plurals by quantifying over sets [Linnebo] |
| 11259 | How can you seek knowledge of something if you don't know it? [Plato] |
| 23472 | The sense of propositions relies on the world's basic logical structure [Wittgenstein] |
| 10643 | We speak of a theory's 'ideological commitments' as well as its 'ontological commitments' [Linnebo] |
| 10637 | Ordinary speakers posit objects without concern for ontology [Linnebo] |
| 20219 | True opinions only become really valuable when they are tied down by reasons [Plato] |
| 5985 | Seeking and learning are just recollection [Plato] |
| 5986 | The slave boy learns geometry from questioning, not teaching, so it is recollection [Plato] |
| 23500 | My main problem is the order of the world, and whether it is knowable a priori [Wittgenstein] |
| 1923 | As a guide to action, true opinion is as good as knowledge [Plato] |
| 1919 | You don't need to learn what you know, and how do you seek for what you don't know? [Plato] |
| 22323 | The philosophical I is the metaphysical subject, the limit - not a part of the world [Wittgenstein] |
| 23481 | Propositions assemble a world experimentally, like the model of a road accident [Wittgenstein] |
| 10634 | Predicates are 'distributive' or 'non-distributive'; do individuals do what the group does? [Linnebo] |
| 1913 | Is virtue taught, or achieved by practice, or a natural aptitude, or what? [Plato] |
| 1921 | If virtue is a type of knowledge then it ought to be taught [Plato] |
| 1927 | It seems that virtue is neither natural nor taught, but is a divine gift [Plato] |
| 1918 | How can you know part of virtue without knowing the whole? [Plato] |
| 1916 | Even if virtues are many and various, they must have something in common to make them virtues [Plato] |
| 4678 | Absolute prohibitions are the essence of ethics, and suicide is the most obvious example [Wittgenstein] |