69 ideas
| 12274 | Begin examination with basics, and subdivide till you can go no further [Aristotle] |
| 12260 | Dialectic starts from generally accepted opinions [Aristotle] |
| 12291 | There can't be one definition of two things, or two definitions of the same thing [Aristotle] |
| 12292 | Definitions are easily destroyed, since they can contain very many assertions [Aristotle] |
| 12272 | We describe the essence of a particular thing by means of its differentiae [Aristotle] |
| 12279 | The differentia indicate the qualities, but not the essence [Aristotle] |
| 12283 | In definitions the first term to be assigned ought to be the genus [Aristotle] |
| 12289 | The genera and the differentiae are part of the essence [Aristotle] |
| 12261 | Differentia are generic, and belong with genus [Aristotle] |
| 12263 | 'Genus' is part of the essence shared among several things [Aristotle] |
| 12285 | The definition is peculiar to one thing, not common to many [Aristotle] |
| 9449 | The plausible Barcan formula implies modality in the actual world [Bird] |
| 11261 | Puzzles arise when reasoning seems equal on both sides [Aristotle] |
| 12273 | Unit is the starting point of number [Aristotle] |
| 9501 | If all existents are causally active, that excludes abstracta and causally isolated objects [Bird] |
| 9500 | If naturalism refers to supervenience, that leaves necessary entities untouched [Bird] |
| 12267 | There are ten categories: essence, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, activity, passivity [Aristotle] |
| 12282 | An individual property has to exist (in past, present or future) [Aristotle] |
| 12264 | An 'accident' is something which may possibly either belong or not belong to a thing [Aristotle] |
| 9502 | There might be just one fundamental natural property [Bird] |
| 9477 | Categorical properties are not modally fixed, but change across possible worlds [Bird] |
| 9490 | The categoricalist idea is that a property is only individuated by being itself [Bird] |
| 9495 | If we abstractly define a property, that doesn't mean some object could possess it [Bird] |
| 9492 | Categoricalists take properties to be quiddities, with no essential difference between them [Bird] |
| 9503 | To name an abundant property is either a Fregean concept, or a simple predicate [Bird] |
| 14540 | Only real powers are fundamental [Bird, by Mumford/Anjum] |
| 9450 | If all properties are potencies, and stimuli and manifestation characterise them, there is a regress [Bird] |
| 9498 | The essence of a potency involves relations, e.g. mass, to impressed force and acceleration [Bird] |
| 9474 | A disposition is finkish if a time delay might mean the manifestation fizzles out [Bird] |
| 9475 | A robust pot attached to a sensitive bomb is not fragile, but if struck it will easily break [Bird] |
| 9499 | Megarian actualists deny unmanifested dispositions [Bird] |
| 9486 | Why should a universal's existence depend on instantiation in an existing particular? [Bird] |
| 9472 | Resemblance itself needs explanation, presumably in terms of something held in common [Bird] |
| 12280 | Genus gives the essence better than the differentiae do [Aristotle] |
| 13269 | In the case of a house the parts can exist without the whole, so parts are not the whole [Aristotle] |
| 12284 | Everything that is has one single essence [Aristotle] |
| 12262 | An 'idion' belongs uniquely to a thing, but is not part of its essence [Aristotle] |
| 12290 | Destruction is dissolution of essence [Aristotle] |
| 12286 | If two things are the same, they must have the same source and origin [Aristotle] |
| 12266 | 'Same' is mainly for names or definitions, but also for propria, and for accidents [Aristotle] |
| 12287 | Two identical things have the same accidents, they are the same; if the accidents differ, they're different [Aristotle] |
| 12288 | Numerical sameness and generic sameness are not the same [Aristotle] |
| 9482 | If the laws necessarily imply p, that doesn't give a new 'nomological' necessity [Bird] |
| 12259 | Reasoning is when some results follow necessarily from certain claims [Aristotle] |
| 9481 | Logical necessitation is not a kind of necessity; George Orwell not being Eric Blair is not a real possibility [Bird] |
| 9505 | Empiricist saw imaginability and possibility as close, but now they seem remote [Bird] |
| 9491 | Haecceitism says identity is independent of qualities and without essence [Bird] |
| 604 | Knowledge is mind and knowing 'cohabiting' [Lycophron, by Aristotle] |
| 12271 | Induction is the progress from particulars to universals [Aristotle] |
| 12293 | We say 'so in cases of this kind', but how do you decide what is 'of this kind'? [Aristotle] |
| 9487 | We can't reject all explanations because of a regress; inexplicable A can still explain B [Bird] |
| 12277 | Friendship is preferable to money, since its excess is preferable [Aristotle] |
| 12276 | Justice and self-control are better than courage, because they are always useful [Aristotle] |
| 12275 | We value friendship just for its own sake [Aristotle] |
| 12281 | Man is intrinsically a civilized animal [Aristotle] |
| 12265 | All water is the same, because of a certain similarity [Aristotle] |
| 9493 | We should explain causation by powers, not powers by causation [Bird] |
| 9494 | Singularism about causes is wrong, as the universals involved imply laws [Bird] |
| 9507 | Laws are explanatory relationships of things, which supervene on their essences [Bird] |
| 9488 | Laws are either disposition regularities, or relations between properties [Bird] |
| 9496 | That other diamonds are hard does not explain why this one is [Bird] |
| 9479 | Dispositional essentialism says laws (and laws about laws) are guaranteed regularities [Bird] |
| 9473 | Laws cannot offer unified explanations if they don't involve universals [Bird] |
| 9484 | If the universals for laws must be instantiated, a vanishing particular could destroy a law [Bird] |
| 9506 | Salt necessarily dissolves in water, because of the law which makes the existence of salt possible [Bird] |
| 23713 | Most laws supervene on fundamental laws, which are explained by basic powers [Bird, by Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
| 9489 | Essentialism can't use conditionals to explain regularities, because of possible interventions [Bird] |
| 9504 | The relational view of space-time doesn't cover times and places where things could be [Bird] |
| 12278 | 'Being' and 'oneness' are predicated of everything which exists [Aristotle] |