Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Vagueness, Truth and Logic' and 'Significance of the Kripkean Nec A Posteriori'

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18 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 5. Modern Philosophy / c. Modern philosophy mid-period
13966 Analytic philosophy loved the necessary a priori analytic, linguistic modality, and rigour [Soames]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
13974 If philosophy is analysis of meaning, available to all competent speakers, what's left for philosophers? [Soames]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 6. Logical Analysis
9766 Study vagueness first by its logic, then by its truth-conditions, and then its metaphysics [Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
9775 Excluded Middle, and classical logic, may fail for vague predicates [Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
9771 Logic holding between indefinite sentences is the core of all language [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / d. Vagueness as linguistic
9768 Vagueness is semantic, a deficiency of meaning [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / e. Higher-order vagueness
9776 A thing might be vaguely vague, giving us higher-order vagueness [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / f. Supervaluation for vagueness
9767 A vague sentence is only true for all ways of making it completely precise [Fine,K]
9770 Logical connectives cease to be truth-functional if vagueness is treated with three values [Fine,K]
9772 Meaning is both actual (determining instances) and potential (possibility of greater precision) [Fine,K]
9773 With the super-truth approach, the classical connectives continue to work [Fine,K]
9774 Borderline cases must be under our control, as capable of greater precision [Fine,K]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
9769 Vagueness can be in predicates, names or quantifiers [Fine,K]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
13969 Kripkean essential properties and relations are necessary, in all genuinely possible worlds [Soames]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 3. Necessity by Convention
13973 A key achievement of Kripke is showing that important modalities are not linguistic in source [Soames]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
13968 Kripkean possible worlds are abstract maximal states in which the real world could have been [Soames]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
604 Knowledge is mind and knowing 'cohabiting' [Lycophron, by Aristotle]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 10. Two-Dimensional Semantics
13972 Two-dimensionalism reinstates descriptivism, and reconnects necessity and apriority to analyticity [Soames]