10 ideas
18823 | To say there could have been people who don't exist, but deny those possible things, rejects Barcan [Stalnaker, by Rumfitt] |
11989 | For Russell, expressions dependent on contingent circumstances must be eliminated [Kaplan] |
16409 | Unlike Lewis, I defend an actualist version of counterpart theory [Stalnaker] |
16411 | If possible worlds really differ, I can't be in more than one at a time [Stalnaker] |
16412 | If counterparts exist strictly in one world only, this seems to be extreme invariant essentialism [Stalnaker] |
11990 | 'Haecceitism' says that sameness or difference of individuals is independent of appearances [Kaplan] |
9668 | 'Haecceitism' is common thisness under dissimilarity, or distinct thisnesses under resemblance [Kaplan] |
11991 | If quantification into modal contexts is legitimate, that seems to imply some form of haecceitism [Kaplan] |
604 | Knowledge is mind and knowing 'cohabiting' [Lycophron, by Aristotle] |
16410 | Extensional semantics has individuals and sets; modal semantics has intensions, functions of world to extension [Stalnaker] |