Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Impossibility of Superdupervenience', 'Realism in Mathematics' and 'Quine on Quantifying In'

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10 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 7. Natural Sets
8755 Maddy replaces pure sets with just objects and perceived sets of objects [Maddy, by Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
12220 Is it the sentence-token or the sentence-type that has a logical form? [Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
12222 Substitutional quantification is referential quantification over expressions [Fine,K]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
10718 A natural number is a property of sets [Maddy, by Oliver]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 2. Intuition of Mathematics
8756 Intuition doesn't support much mathematics, and we should question its reliability [Maddy, by Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
17733 We know mind-independent mathematical truths through sets, which rest on experience [Maddy, by Jenkins]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 3. Levels of Reality
16062 A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
16061 If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
16060 Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow]
16064 The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow]