Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Why Constitution is not Identity', 'Environmental Politics: very short intro' and 'Pref to new 'Materialist Theory''

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23 ideas

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
16078 Clay is intrinsically and atomically the same as statue (and that lacks 'modal properties') [Rudder Baker]
16077 The clay is not a statue - it borrows that property from the statue it constitutes [Rudder Baker]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / d. Coincident objects
16080 Is it possible for two things that are identical to become two separate things? [Rudder Baker]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object
16076 Constitution is not identity, as consideration of essential predicates shows [Rudder Baker]
16081 The constitution view gives a unified account of the relation of persons/bodies, statues/bronze etc [Rudder Baker]
16082 Statues essentially have relational properties lacked by lumps [Rudder Baker]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
7440 Secondary qualities are microscopic primary qualities of physical things [Armstrong]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / b. Essence of consciousness
7437 Consciousness and experience of qualities are not the same [Armstrong]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 1. Behaviourism
7434 Behaviourism is false, but mind is definable as the cause of behaviour [Armstrong]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
7436 The manifestations of a disposition need never actually exist [Armstrong]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 4. Causal Functionalism
7429 Causal Functionalism says mental states are apt for producing behaviour [Armstrong]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 5. Teleological Functionalism
7438 A causal theory of mentality would be improved by a teleological element [Armstrong]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
7431 The identity of mental states with physical properties is contingent, because the laws of nature are contingent [Armstrong]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
7432 One mental role might be filled by a variety of physical types [Armstrong]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 4. Changing the State / b. Devolution
23429 The environment needs localised politics, with its care for the land [Dobson]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 1. Ideology
23424 An ideology judges things now, and offers an ideal, with a strategy for reaching it [Dobson]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / g. Liberalism critique
23426 Ecologism is often non-liberal, by claiming to know other people's best interests [Dobson]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 8. Socialism
23427 Socialism can be productive and centralised, or less productive and decentralised [Dobson]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 12. Feminism
23428 Difference feminists say women differ fundamentally from men [Dobson]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 13. Green Politics
23422 For the environment, affluence and technology matter as much as population size [Dobson]
23425 Ecologism says growth must be reduced, and efficiency is not enough [Dobson]
23430 A million years is a proper unit of political time [Dobson]
23423 We currently value the present fourteen times more highly than the future [Dobson]