21 ideas
18851 | Pairing (with Extensionality) guarantees an infinity of sets, just from a single element [Rosen] |
18852 | A Meinongian principle might say that there is an object for any modest class of properties [Rosen] |
16078 | Clay is intrinsically and atomically the same as statue (and that lacks 'modal properties') [Rudder Baker] |
16077 | The clay is not a statue - it borrows that property from the statue it constitutes [Rudder Baker] |
16080 | Is it possible for two things that are identical to become two separate things? [Rudder Baker] |
16076 | Constitution is not identity, as consideration of essential predicates shows [Rudder Baker] |
16081 | The constitution view gives a unified account of the relation of persons/bodies, statues/bronze etc [Rudder Baker] |
16082 | Statues essentially have relational properties lacked by lumps [Rudder Baker] |
18849 | Metaphysical necessity is absolute and universal; metaphysical possibility is very tolerant [Rosen] |
18850 | 'Metaphysical' modality is the one that makes the necessity or contingency of laws of nature interesting [Rosen] |
18858 | Sets, universals and aggregates may be metaphysically necessary in one sense, but not another [Rosen] |
18857 | Standard Metaphysical Necessity: P holds wherever the actual form of the world holds [Rosen] |
18856 | Non-Standard Metaphysical Necessity: when ¬P is incompatible with the nature of things [Rosen] |
18848 | Something may be necessary because of logic, but is that therefore a special sort of necessity? [Rosen] |
18855 | Combinatorial theories of possibility assume the principles of combination don't change across worlds [Rosen] |
18853 | A proposition is 'correctly' conceivable if an ominiscient being could conceive it [Rosen] |
19722 | We could know the evidence for our belief without knowing why it is such evidence [Mittag] |
19723 | Evidentialism can't explain that we accept knowledge claims if the evidence is forgotten [Mittag] |
19720 | Evidentialism concerns the evidence for the proposition, not for someone to believe it [Mittag] |
19721 | Coherence theories struggle with the role of experience [Mittag] |
18854 | The MRL view says laws are the theorems of the simplest and strongest account of the world [Rosen] |