Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Why Constitution is not Identity', 'Putnam's Paradox' and 'Moral Relativism'

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14 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 2. Isomorphisms
14212 A consistent theory just needs one model; isomorphic versions will do too, and large domains provide those [Lewis]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
14213 Anti-realists see the world as imaginary, or lacking joints, or beyond reference, or beyond truth [Lewis]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
16078 Clay is intrinsically and atomically the same as statue (and that lacks 'modal properties') [Rudder Baker]
16077 The clay is not a statue - it borrows that property from the statue it constitutes [Rudder Baker]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / d. Coincident objects
16080 Is it possible for two things that are identical to become two separate things? [Rudder Baker]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object
16076 Constitution is not identity, as consideration of essential predicates shows [Rudder Baker]
16081 The constitution view gives a unified account of the relation of persons/bodies, statues/bronze etc [Rudder Baker]
16082 Statues essentially have relational properties lacked by lumps [Rudder Baker]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
14210 A gerrymandered mereological sum can be a mess, but still have natural joints [Lewis]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
22449 When we say 'is red' we don't mean 'seems red to most people' [Foot]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
14215 Causal theories of reference make errors in reference easy [Lewis]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
14209 Descriptive theories remain part of the theory of reference (with seven mild modifications) [Lewis]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / e. Ethical cognitivism
22451 All people need affection, cooperation, community and help in trouble [Foot]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
22452 Do we have a concept of value, other than wanting something, or making an effort to get it? [Foot]