14 ideas
| 8349 | The best way to do ontology is to make sense of our normal talk [Davidson] |
| 8348 | If we don't assume that events exist, we cannot make sense of our common talk [Davidson] |
| 16078 | Clay is intrinsically and atomically the same as statue (and that lacks 'modal properties') [Rudder Baker] |
| 16077 | The clay is not a statue - it borrows that property from the statue it constitutes [Rudder Baker] |
| 16080 | Is it possible for two things that are identical to become two separate things? [Rudder Baker] |
| 16076 | Constitution is not identity, as consideration of essential predicates shows [Rudder Baker] |
| 16081 | The constitution view gives a unified account of the relation of persons/bodies, statues/bronze etc [Rudder Baker] |
| 16082 | Statues essentially have relational properties lacked by lumps [Rudder Baker] |
| 8347 | Explanations typically relate statements, not events [Davidson] |
| 7844 | The Golden Rule is accepted everywhere, and gives a fixed target for morality [Voltaire] |
| 10371 | Distinguish causation, which is in the world, from explanations, which depend on descriptions [Davidson, by Schaffer,J] |
| 8403 | Either facts, or highly unspecific events, serve better as causes than concrete events [Field,H on Davidson] |
| 8346 | Full descriptions can demonstrate sufficiency of cause, but not necessity [Davidson] |
| 4778 | A singular causal statement is true if it is held to fall under a law [Davidson, by Psillos] |