Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Why Constitution is not Identity', 'Mind in a Physical World' and 'Hat-Tricks and Heaps'

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29 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
Metaphysics is the clarification of the ontological relationships between different areas of thought [Kim]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / b. The Heap paradox ('Sorites')
The smallest heap has four objects: three on the bottom, one on the top [Hart,WD, by Sorensen]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
Reductionism is good on light, genes, temperature and transparency [Kim, by PG]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
Supervenience is linked to dependence [Kim]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / b. Types of supervenience
Mereological supervenience says wholes are fixed by parts [Kim]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
Causal power is a good way of distinguishing the real from the unreal [Kim]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 7. Emergent Properties
Properties can have causal powers lacked by their constituents [Kim]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
Clay is intrinsically and atomically the same as statue (and that lacks 'modal properties') [Rudder Baker]
The clay is not a statue - it borrows that property from the statue it constitutes [Rudder Baker]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / d. Coincident objects
Is it possible for two things that are identical to become two separate things? [Rudder Baker]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object
Constitution is not identity, as consideration of essential predicates shows [Rudder Baker]
The constitution view gives a unified account of the relation of persons/bodies, statues/bronze etc [Rudder Baker]
Statues essentially have relational properties lacked by lumps [Rudder Baker]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
There are two contradictory arguments about everything [Kim]
Protagoras says arguments on both sides are always equal [Kim, by Seneca]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique
Not every person is the measure of all things, but only wise people [Plato on Kim]
Why didn't Protagoras begin by saying "a tadpole is the measure of all things"? [Plato on Kim]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 3. Mental Causation
Agency, knowledge, reason, memory, psychology all need mental causes [Kim, by PG]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
It seems impossible that an exact physical copy of this world could lack intentionality [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
Intentionality as function seems possible [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 1. Reductionism critique
Maybe intentionality is reducible, but qualia aren't [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 4. Emergentism
Emergentism says there is no explanation for a supervenient property [Kim]
The only mental property that might be emergent is that of qualia [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
Non-Reductive Physicalism relies on supervenience [Kim]
Maybe strong supervenience implies reduction [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique
Identity theory was overthrown by multiple realisations and causal anomalies [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
Multiple realisation applies to other species, and even one individual over time [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / c. Knowledge argument
Knowledge and inversion make functionalism about qualia doubtful [Kim]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / a. Nature of emotions
Emotions have both intentionality and qualia [Kim]