18 ideas
20728 | Metaphysics is hopeless with its present epistemology; common-sense realism is needed [Colvin] |
20726 | We can only distinguish self from non-self if there is an inflexible external reality [Colvin] |
20727 | Common-sense realism rests on our interests and practical life [Colvin] |
20729 | Arguments that objects are unknowable or non-existent assume the knower's existence [Colvin] |
20730 | If objects are doubted because their appearances change, that presupposes one object [Colvin] |
20731 | The idea that everything is relations is contradictory; relations are part of the concept of things [Colvin] |
16078 | Clay is intrinsically and atomically the same as statue (and that lacks 'modal properties') [Rudder Baker] |
16077 | The clay is not a statue - it borrows that property from the statue it constitutes [Rudder Baker] |
16080 | Is it possible for two things that are identical to become two separate things? [Rudder Baker] |
16076 | Constitution is not identity, as consideration of essential predicates shows [Rudder Baker] |
16081 | The constitution view gives a unified account of the relation of persons/bodies, statues/bronze etc [Rudder Baker] |
16082 | Statues essentially have relational properties lacked by lumps [Rudder Baker] |
8845 | An experience's having propositional content doesn't make it a belief [Pryor] |
8842 | The best argument for immediate justification is not the Regress Argument, but considering examples [Pryor] |
8843 | Impure coherentists accept that perceptions can justify, unlike pure coherentists [Pryor] |
8844 | Coherentism rests on the claim that justifications must be beliefs, with propositional content [Pryor] |
8846 | Reasons for beliefs can be cited to others, unlike a raw headache experience [Pryor] |
8847 | Beliefs are not chosen, but you can seek ways to influence your belief [Pryor] |